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4Preface 
No Stress III is the third report in the ‘No Stress’ se-
ries.  This report focuses exclusively on the Bank of 
England’s 2016 stress tests of the resilience of the UK 
banking system. Like its predecessors, it suggests that 
the UK banking system is in much worse financial shape 
than the Bank of England suggests: the stress tests seek 
to demonstrate a resilience that simply isn’t there. The 
UK banking system is still highly vulnerable and anoth-
er major shock could bring it down again. 
In writing No Stress III I have benefited enormously 
from the feedback and other helpful inputs from many 
people who have generously shared their time and ex-
pertise, and I would like to thank them all most warm-
ly: Anat Admati, Timothy Alexander, John Allison, 
Steve Baker, Mark Billings, David Blake, Roger Brown,
Tim Bush, David Campbell, David Cronin, Jim Dorn, 
James Ferguson, Charles Goodhart, Martin Hutchin-
son, Gordon Kerr, Matthew Kilcoyne, Alasdair Macle-
od, Wande McCunn, Imad Moosa, Gerald O’Driscoll, 
Ben Southwood, Walker Todd, Sir John Vickers, and 
Basil Zafiriou. I would also like to thank a number of 
anonymous Bank of England officials for helpful dis-
cussions on some of the issues covered in this report. 
5Executive summary
• The Bank of England uses its stress tests to reas-
sure the public that the UK banking system is safe. 
However, the Bank’s reassurances lack credibility 
and are contradicted by the evidence. 
• Rightly interpreted, the stress tests demonstrate the 
opposite of what the Bank claims they do: they dem-
onstrate that UK banks are still financially weak and 
far from resilient. The UK banking system is an acci-
dent waiting to happen.
• The conclusion that UK banks are weak is con-
firmed by an analysis of their capital positions and is 
further confirmed by banks’ market values being less 
than their book values. Low market values indicate 
problems with the banks that the stress tests did not 
pick up.
• The Bank made a number of mistakes in its stress 
tests. Among these: it relied on book values instead 
of market values, relied on unreliable metrics such as 
risk-weighted assets and Tier 1 capital, relief on a sin-
gle stress scenario and used insufficiently demand-
ing pass standards. The Bank’s stress model also 
produced implausibly low projected losses and so 
failed a basic reality check.
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• More generally, the stress tests are based on a series 
of imprudent judgments that led the Bank to miss 
obvious problems with UK banks.
• Regulatory stress testing is a highly imperfect tool 
with a track record of repeated failure in other coun-
tries, is compromised by conflicting objectives and 
by the Bank’s poor forecasting record. It is also com-
promised by basic Public Choice economics, i.e., that 
public agencies act in accordance with their own 
interest. 
• It also creates invisible systemic risks by pressuring 
banks to standardise their risk management practices 
to conform to the Bank’s view of the risks they face.
• Far from providing a credible assurance that the 
banking system is safe, the stress tests are worse 
than useless because they provide false comfort, sug-
gesting that the UK banking system is safe when it 
is clearly not. In this sense, the stress tests are like a 
ship’s radar system that cannot detect an iceberg in 
plain view.
• The stress test programme is therefore dangerous 
and should be scrapped.
NO STRESS III 7
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1. Introduction
On November 30th 2016, the Bank of England released 
the results of its third publicly disclosed set of stress 
tests of the financial resilience of the UK banking sys-
tem.
It is important to appreciate why these stress tests mat-
ter: what is at stake is whether our banks are safe or not.
Now the Bank of England uses its stress tests to reas-
sure us that our banking system is safe. If the Bank is 
correct, then we can conclude that it has successfully 
‘fixed’ the banking system after the trauma of the Glob-
al Financial Crisis (GFC), but if the Bank is wrong, then 
the banking system is still not fixed and another major 
shock could bring it down again. Another major shock 
is only a matter of time.
I believe the Bank is wrong and evidently so: our bank-
ing system is an accident waiting to happen.
8 NO STRESS III
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The 2016 stress test exercise was then entirely predict-
able: the Bank of England announced that the banking 
system was in good shape but its own test results and 
other evidence clearly suggested the opposite – same as 
with the earlier stress tests.
The spin that the Bank put on the results is that the 
banking system passes with flying colours even though 
one of the seven big banks involved failed (RBS) and 
two others (Barclays and Standard Chartered) were 
deemed to be problematic.
Let’s pass over the slight contradiction at the heart of 
that narrative and quote Governor Carney:1
“The resilience of the system during the past year 
in part reflects the consistent build-up of capital 
resources by banks since the global financial crisis. 
… the UK banking system is well placed to provide 
credit to households and businesses during periods 
of severe stress.
“That conclusion is corroborated by the 2016 stress 
test [which is] broad, coherent and severe …”2 
1 Remember too that the 8th biggest bank, the Co-op Bank, was left out from 
the stress tests because you didn’t need a stress test to demonstrate that it was a 
basket case. Thus, 4 of the biggest 8 banks are “officially” problematic – and, as 
we shall see, the others have their issues too.
2 Bank of England, “Opening remarks by the Governor.” Financial Stability 
Report Press Conference, 30 November 2016, p. 3. Available at http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/2016/fsrspnote301116.pdf.
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THE BANK’S STRESS SCENARIO AND ITS 
IMPACT ON UK BANKS
Every one of these claims is questionable, but let’s focus 
on the severity of the Bank’s adverse stress scenario, 
often hyped up in the press as its ‘doomsday’ scenario.
The latest stress scenario was about on a par with its 
predecessors, severe but hardly doomsday: there are a 
bunch of adverse events, including world and UK re-
cessions (annual global GDP growth troughs at -1.9 per-
cent and UK GDP falls by 4.3 percentage points), major 
falls (over 30 percent and over 40 percent) in the prices 
of houses and Commercial Real Estate (CRE), unem-
ployment rising by 4.5 percentage points and sundry 
other stuff. However, the key phrase is this: “Overall, 
the UK stress is roughly equivalent to that experienced 
during the financial crisis, albeit with a shallower fall in 
domestic output …”3 
So the Bank’s stress scenario was not quite as stress-
ful as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Now consider 
how this adverse scenario impacts the banks. To quote 
Governor Carney, the adverse stress scenario led to 
“system-wide losses of £44 billion over the first two 
years of the stress – five times those incurred by the 
same banks over the two years at the height of the finan-
cial crisis.”4 
3 Bank of England, Stress testing the UK banking system, November 2016, p. 6.
4 Governor’s remarks, p. 4. Strictly speaking, the £44 billion number is only the 
net loss, and it might have been more appropriate to have reported the gross loss 
(£63 billion) instead.
10 NO STRESS III
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This statement misled some commentators into think-
ing that the stress scenario was five times more severe 
than the GFC, but it wasn’t. Carney’s statement implies 
that the system-wide losses over the two height years of 
the crisis were less than £44 billion/5 = £8.8 billion.
One wonders how this statement is to be squared, say, 
with the BoE’s own recent estimates that HBOS alone 
experienced losses of £34.6 billion in 2008-2009 and 
losses of £52.6 billion in the period 2008-2011.5 HBOS 
was not even among the big 4 banks. Among the big 4, 
RBS experienced a loss of £40.7 billion in 2008 alone 
and losses in excess of £51 billion over the period 2007-
2010.6, 7 Governor Carney’s claim about the losses banks 
experienced in the crisis is wrong.8
In fact, the banks spread out their reported losses over 
the period since, because they were afraid of the adverse 
public reaction if they had disclosed them promptly and 
were concerned that revealing the true extent of their in-
solvency would have undermined their efforts to obtain 
5 Bank of England, The failure of HBOS plc (HBOS): A report by the Financial 
Conduct Authority, (FCA), and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), 
November 2015, Table 1.2.
6 Financial Services Authority, The failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
December 2011, p. 38.
7 See UK and Irish Banks Capital Losses – Post Mortem, Local Authorities 
Pension Fund Forum, September 2011, p. 3.
8 For system-wide losses over the crisis, consider two different independent 
assessments: (a) The 2011 LAPFF study (op. cit.) suggests system-wide losses of 
over £98.4 billion over the period 2007-2010. (b) The Parliamentary Committee 
on Banking Standards (“An accident waiting to happen: the failure of HBOS”, 
April 2013, p. 39) suggests system-wide losses of £126 billion over the period 
2008-2011.
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state bailouts. Consequently, the appropriate compari-
son is not with reported losses over these two years only 
but with cumulative losses post-2007. As James Fergu-
son of The MacroStrategy Partnership points out, the 
cumulative losses to date for the big 4 banks alone were 
about £440 billion.9
The system-wide £44 billion losses generated by the 
Bank’s stress model are not five times the losses in-
curred at the height of the crisis but 44 divided by 440, 
or about a tenth of the losses banks experienced by the 
Big 4 since 2007.
But how can a supposedly severe stress scenario lead to 
the mild losses projected by the Bank’s stress model?
The only plausible answer is that it can’t: the link from 
the projected shocks to the projected losses is way too 
weak and the projected losses are way too low.
This point in and of itself is enough to discredit the entire 
stress test exercise.
To elaborate, recall that the scenario entails falls of 30+ 
percent and 40+ percent in the prices of houses and 
CRE. These are large falls to be sure, but the resulting 
net loss of £44 billion is a fairly small hit. With the big 
seven having almost £2.1 trillion in loan assets as of end-
2016q3, a loss of £44 billion is equivalent to a loan loss 
rate of about 3 percent. This figure is, as Mr. Ferguson 
9 J. Ferguson, “UK bank ‘stress’ test,” The Macrostrategy Partnership, 2 
December 2016, p. 2.
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notes, “far shy of the ‘typical’ bank crisis loan loss rate 
of 10 percent, which is about what the banks have en-
dured to date, during the resolution of the GFC.”10
As a further comparison, the BoE’s 3 percent projected 
loss rate is also well under the 4.1 percent projected loss 
rate from the European Banking Authority’s most re-
cent ( July 2016) stress tests, which few observers took 
seriously.
One then has to ask how such large falls in real estate 
prices could lead to such mild loss numbers. Consider 
the possibilities:
The first is that is UK banks have relatively small posi-
tions in real estate, but we know that that is not the case.
The second is that UK banks have sizeable real estate 
positions but are well hedged against them, so a large 
fall in real estate will inflict relatively little damage. 
However, whilst it would be comforting to believe this 
explanation, it is implausible and there is no evidence to 
support it. 11
10 Ferguson, op. cit., p. 3.
11 To elaborate, a fairly small fall in real estate is not likely to inflict high losses 
on the banks because the initial losses are taken mainly by borrowers. As Mr. 
Ferguson points out in an email, bankers would suggest that even a 30 percent 
fall might have a small impact given existing Loan-to-Value ratios, but he goes 
on to point out that a fall of 40 percent might treble or quintuple their losses. 
There is therefore a close to knife-edge quality to banks’ exposure – and we know 
from European experience that large falls in real estate can inflict large losses on 
banks.
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The only other possibility is that the Bank’s model is 
wrong, because the adverse scenario should produce 
much greater projected losses than it does.
Yet in the Q&A at the press conference, Governor Car-
ney makes a remarkable claim:
“the capital hit in this stress would have wiped out 
all of the capital that these same banks had prior to 
the crisis. So this is a big, big hit to capital.”12
This claim is also wrong and for two reasons:
1. For the big four banks alone, their 2006 Annual 
Reports report that their Tier 1 capital going into 
2007 was about £116 billion. The projected £44 bil-
lion loss from the Bank’s stress test model is only 
38 percent of this number, and would be even lower 
if we included the capital of the other banks in the 
exercise.
2. In any case, a loss of £44 billion across the 7 big-
gest banks is not a “big,big hit”: it is, in fact, well 
under 1 percent of total assets.
THE FICTION OF THE 
‘GREAT CAPITAL REBUILD’
We should also consider the stress test in the context of 
the Bank’s ‘Great Capital Rebuild’ narrative. To para-
phrase Governor Carney’s comments when the 2015 
12 Financial Stability Report Q&A, p. 19.
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stress tests were released: the post-GFC period and the 
long march to higher capital are over. The message – 
which he has repeated since – is that UK banks are now 
more or less fully capitalised.
Let’s look at the evidence. Exhibit A, on the following 
page, is the chart (Chart B.2) from the BoE’s Novem-
ber 2016 Financial Stability Report.
NO STRESS III 15
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Chart 1.1: Major UK Banks’ Leverage Ratios
Sources: PRA regulatory returns, published accounts and Bank calculations.
Notes:
(a) Prior to 2012, data are based on the simple leverage ratio defined as the ratio 
of shareholders’ claims to total assets based on banks’ published accounts (note 
a discontinuity due to introduction of IFRS accounting standards in 2005, which 
tends to reduce leverage ratios thereafter).
(b) Weighted by total exposures.
(c) The Basel III leverage ratio corresponds to aggregate peer group Tier 1 capital 
over aggregate leverage ratio exposure. Up to 2013, Tier 1 capital includes grand-
fathered capital instruments and the exposure measure is based on the Basel 2010 
definition. From 2014 H1, Tier 1 capital excludes grandfathered capital instru-
ments and the exposure measure is based on the Basel 2014 definition.
16 NO STRESS III
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This chart shows some of the BoE’s own estimates of 
UK banks’ leverage ratios spanning 2001 to 2016: the 
leverage ratio is the ratio of some measure of capital to 
the total amount at risk. This chart indicates that UK 
banks’ leverage ratios are a little higher than a decade 
ago – maybe 40% on this measure, but certainly no mul-
tiple – and a decade ago the banks were on the eve of an 
almighty crash.
Now comparing leverage ratios before the GFC and af-
ter is a tricky business because of definitional changes 
made by Basel III. Yet the Bank itself publishes figures 
for two leverage ratios known as Simple Leverage Ra-
tios (SLRs): the ratio of shareholder equity to total as-
sets. One refers to the book value of shareholder equity 
and the other to the market value of shareholder eq-
uity. These series give average SLRs across the bank-
ing system and span the period from before the GFC 
until recently.13 To the extent that we can rely on these 
to give us a before and after comparison, the average 
book value SLR was just under 4.1 percent in 2006 and 
6.2 percent in the first half of 2016, representing an in-
crease of 51 percent.14 
The corresponding market value SLR was 8.0 percent 
going into 2006 and 5.28 percent in November 2015, 
13 These figures will overstate the leverage ratio and understate true levels of 
leverage because they use the larger Shareholder Equity measure rather a narrow 
core capital measure such as Core Tier 1 or CET1, but they give some sense of 
the trends over time.
14 These figures are to be found on p. 57 of the Bank’s November 2016 
Financial Stability Report.
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representing a decrease of 34 percent.15 By this latter 
measure, UK banks are more highly leveraged now than 
they were going into the crisis. 
I would suggest that it would be prudent to pay atten-
tion to these market value figures: the market values 
being less than book values is a signal that the market 
perceives problems with the book values. 
Then consider that the big four banks’ total Common 
Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital was about £205 billion by 
the end of the third quarter 2016. This figure is barely 
£90 billion higher than the £116 billion Tier 1 capital 
that they had going into 2007, although one must ac-
knowledge that this £90 billion difference does not 
allow for the considerable improvement in quality be-
tween Basel II Tier I capital and Basel III CET1. 
The third quarter 2016 £205 billion CET1 number is a 
book value figure, however, and the corresponding mar-
ket value of its CET1 capital was about £149 billion. 
We should also assess these numbers against the sizes 
of the banks’ balance sheets, and it is traditional to use 
Total Assets as such a measure. Given that their Total 
Assets were just under £5 trillion at the same date, their 
average CET1 leverage ratio (or ratio of CET1 capital to 
15 These figures come from the BoE Excel workbook ‘ccbdec15.xlsx, 
spreadsheet ‘9. Bank equity measures’ under the C column, ‘Market-based 
leverage ratio (%)’. This workbook was accessed on March 9th 2016 but appears 
to have been removed from the BoE website since the time I accessed and 
downloaded it.
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total assets) was 4.1 percent if we go by book values and 
just under 3 percent if we go by market values. 
By the first measure, UK banks are leveraged by a factor 
of 1 divided by 4 percent or 25: they have £25 in assets 
for every £1 in capital; and by the second measure, they 
are leveraged by a factor of over 33. These are high lev-
els of leverage that leave the banks vulnerable to shocks 
– and high levels of leverage aka inadequate capital were 
a key factor contributing to the severity of the GFC. 
Putting all this together, the evidence for a ‘Great Capi-
tal Rebuild’ is not there – especially if one pays atten-
tion to the market value numbers. 
As a further confirmation, Chart B.3 in the Bank’s 
November 2016 Financial Stability Report states that 
“Most capital rebuilding to date has reflected falls in 
risk-weighted assets” – a delightful piece of duckspeak 
– and then gives a breakdown of this ‘rebuild’ in terms 
of its constituent components. The rebuild it is refer-
ring to is not quite what it might seem, however: it re-
fers to the rebuild in the banks’ average ratio of CET1 
capital to risk-weighted assets (RWA) relative to 2009. 
Now the CET1 ratio was 6.92 percent in 2009 and 
had risen to 12.61 percent by end-2015. That increase 
breaks down into 0.45 percentage points in new equity 
raised, 1.02 percentage points in retained earnings and 
4.22 percentage points in reductions in risk-weighted 
assets. Therefore, only 1.47 percentage points of that 
increase in the capital ratio represents actual increases 
in capital; the rest, the 4.22 percentage points decrease 
in risk-weighted assets merely reflects the decrease in 
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the denominator. I would suggest that the chart should 
have stated “Most of the increase in the ratio of capital 
to RWAs to date has reflected falls in risk-weighted as-
sets” but that doesn’t quite convey the same message. 
The increase in the capital ratio from 6.92 percent to 
12.61 percent might seem impressive at first sight – an 
increase of 82 percent – but the actual capital rebuild 
was only from 6.92 percent to 8.39 percent, an increase 
of about 21 percent. That increase is book-value, too. 
Once again, the ‘Great Capital Rebuild’ is not there in 
the data. 
In this context, I should also comment on one of the 
Bank’s standard mantras in recent years, its ‘Ten 
Times’ story: that bank capital requirements are now 
10 times or more than 10 times what they were before 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
Here are some examples:
•  “Capital requirements for banks are much higher 
… In all, new capital requirements are at least sev-
en times the pre-crisis standards for most banks. 
For globally systemic banks, they are more than ten 
times.” (Mark Carney, 2014)16
• “ … the capital requirements of our largest banks 
are now ten times higher than before the crisis.” 
(Mark Carney, 2016)17
16 M. Carney, “The future of financial reform,” 17 November 2014, p. 4.
17 Public statement made on the morning of June 24th 2016 shortly after the 
result of the Brexit vote was announced.
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• “Common equity requirements are seven times 
the pre-crisis standard for most banks. For global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs), they are 
more than ten times higher.” (Mark Carney, 2016)18
• “The largest banks are required to have as much 
as ten times more of the highest quality capital than 
before the crisis … (Mark Carney, 2017)19
This latter claim is particularly significant because Gov-
ernor Carney is referring to the largest banks in the 
world and was writing in his capacity as chairman of the 
Financial Stability Board (i.e., as the world’s most sen-
ior financial regulator) to the leaders of the G20 coun-
tries. He could hardly have chosen a more conspicuous 
forum in which to make his point.
At first sight, these claims are very reassuring. After all, 
if bank capital requirements are now ten times greater 
than they were before the GFC, that must mean that 
our banks are now much more resilient, right? 
Wrong. 
18 M Carney, “Redeeming an unforgiving world,” 26 February 2016, p. 8.
19 M. Carney, Letter to G20 leaders, 3 July 2017, p. 1.
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The evidence for Governor Carney’s claims would 
appear to be the capital requirements in the following 
Table (Table B.2) from the Bank’s July 2016 Financial 
Stability Report:
Notes to Table B.2:
(a) Expressed as a proportion of risk-weighted assets. An additional 1.5% of risk-
weighted assets must be held in AT1 [Additional Tier 1 capital] as part of the 
Basel III Pillar 1 requirement. UK banks are also subject to Pillar 2A requirements.
(b) See Caruana, J. (2012) ‘Building a resilient financial system’, available at 
www.bis.org/speeches/sp120208.pdf.
(c) in a standard environment.
This Table indicates that the minimum Basel II core 
Tier 1 (CT1) capital requirement was 1 percent using 
Basel III definitions. The lines below show the addition-
al requirements for the ratio of Common Equity Tier 1 
(CET1) capital to Risk-Weighted Assets (RWAs), which 
sum to 9 to 11.5 percent depending on the settings for 
the systemic and countercyclical capital buffers. The 
systemic buffer is likely to have an impact of no more 
22 NO STRESS III
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than 0.5 percent of RWAs, however.20 As for the coun-
tercyclical buffer, the Bank of England announced on 
June 27th that this buffer would be raised from 0 per-
cent to 0.5 percent. Therefore the actual value of the 
‘Basel III CET1 minimum with buffers’ term at the bot-
tom of the table should be no more than 8 percent, but 
let’s call it 8 percent to be on the generous side.
One might then say that CET1 Pillar 1 capital require-
ments involving RWAs are currently 8 times their Basel 
II counterparts.21 One might also say that the system 
envisages the potential for CET1 ratio capital require-
ments to be 11.5 times their Basel II counterparts – and 
even higher if one takes account of higher systemic buff-
ers or a higher countercyclical capital buffer or the Pillar 
2A requirements mentioned in Note (a) of the Table. 
At first sight, such an increase in capital requirements 
might appear impressive. But consider the starting base. 
Under Basel II, RWAs could be a hundred times bank 
capital. The average ratio of RWAs to total assets across 
the big 7 UK financial institutions is about 32 percent. 
Applying this ratio, total assets might have been 100 ÷ 
32% = 312.5 times capital: banks could be leveraged by a 
20 The situation is however quite complicated and I won’t attempt to summarise 
it here. Instead, I would refer the reader to J. Vickers “The Systemic Risk Buffer 
for UK Banks: A Response to the Bank of England’s Consultation Paper,” Journal 
of Financial Regulation, Volume 2, Number 2, pp. 264-282. 
21 Strictly speaking, line 2 in the table refers to ‘Basel II Core Tier 1 minimum 
using Basel III definitions’, whereas the later lines refer to ‘Basel III CET1 
minimum’, but it is reasonable to suppose that these two measures are similar if 
not the same. Otherwise, the table would not provide any meaningful comparison 
between Basel II and Basel III. 
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factor of well over 300 under the old rules. Given that 
UK bank CET1 ratio capital requirements are currently 
8 times what they were before the crisis, current re-
quirements would still allow banks to be leveraged by a 
factor of 312.5 ÷ 8 = 39.1. This is a high level of leverage 
and high leverage was a major contributor to the sever-
ity of the crisis. 
And I have not taken account of how UK banks could 
increase their leverage further by switching into assets 
with lower risk weights or by moving positions from 
their banking books to their trading books. 
The bottom line is that a large percentage increase in 
capital requirements does not represent a large abso-
lute increase in capital requirements if the base is low 
to start with.
And why was the base so low? Because Basel II imposed 
extremely low minimum capital requirements. Correct-
ly interpreted, Governor Carney’s ‘10 times’ narrative 
(or to use the more accurate figure, an ‘8 times’ narra-
tive) does not imply that banks now face high capital re-
quirements; it is, instead, a damning indictment of the 
inadequacy of Basel II. 
One can also look at this issue another way. The capi-
tal ratios that matter are not those based on the highly 
unreliable RWA measure: the ratios that matter are the 
leverage ratios. Basel II had no minimum required lever-
age ratio and Basel III introduced a minimum required 
leverage ratio of 3 percent. But this 3 percent minimum 
required leverage ratio is specified with Tier 1 capital as 
24 NO STRESS III
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the numerator and the leverage exposure as denomina-
tor. When one converts this leverage ratio into the ratio 
of CET1 to total assets using Basel rules and recent data 
for UK banks, the minimum ratio of CET1 to total as-
sets is about 2.4 percent, allowing for a leverage factor 
of over 40.
Therefore, one can say that when it comes to the lev-
erage ratio, the Basel III requirements are not 8 times 
or 10 times or even 20 times what they were: they are 
infinitely greater than what they were. Even so, they are 
still too low. 
It is not for nothing that Martin Wolf has described Ba-
sel III as the mouse that did not roar.22
Slinging around multiples of capital ratios is great fun, 
to be sure, but there is a more serious side too. The 
question one must ask is why does the Bank choose to 
emphasise this 10 times narrative to make their point 
that UK banks are now strong again, when the underly-
ing facts on the ground – the leverage ratios especially 
– do not support that narrative. One might say the same 
about their stress test (fairy?) story too. 
THE INADEQUACY OF THE INCURRED LOSS 
ACCOUNTING MODEL
Dr. Carney’s responses in the Q&A also referred to 
another important issue that deserves attention: the 
22 M. Wolf, “Basel: the mouse that did not roar,” Financial Times, 10 September 
2010.
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inadequacy of the incurred loss accounting model under 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS and 
in particular, IAS 39) by which losses are not recognised 
until they have been incurred and the inadequacy of the 
proposed solution to this problem, IFRS 9. The prob-
lem with the incurred loss model is that expected losses 
are not recognised at all.23 The problem with IFRS 9 is 
that expected losses are recognised only if they are ex-
pected within 12 months. As he said in response to a 
question:
“Now there is another issue which is not adjusted 
for in the stress tests which is coming which is IFRS 
9, which not yet finalised and could have some im-
pact. But I think you know the banks, the analyst 
community, ourselves, we all have equal line of sight 
to that and its timing.”24
So Governor Carney acknowledges that the Bank’s 
stress tests are based on accounting rules that ignore 
expected losses. This omission is a major source of con-
cern, however, and must be one of the factors contribut-
ing to the low losses projected by the Bank’s stress test 
model: there will be expected losses coming through 
the system that the Bank’s model does not pick up at 
the point of supposed maximum stress. 
His response indicates that the Bank believes that the 
implementation of IFRS 9 will not pose a major prob-
lem. 
23  At least at a portfolio level: they can be recognized for individual assets. 
24  Press conference Q&A, p. 18.
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I disagree. To quote Tim Bush from his March 2017 evi-
dence to the Treasury Committee Capital Enquiry:
IFRS 9 is not a full expected loss model. It differs 
from IAS 39 in two major respects:
• It books 12 months expected losses on all loans. 
That is clearly deficient if there are material ex-
pected losses in, e.g., years 2-5.
• When a trigger occurs IFRS then books all ex-
pected losses. That creates a “cliff edge” effect, 
i.e., all losses come in one go, whereas IAS 39 de-
fers them.
In short, IFRS 9 is still booking losses too late. But 
when the losses are booked, they arrive in one go.25 
There is then the danger that the implementation of 
IFRS 9 starting in 2018 will lead to the partial revela-
tion of expected losses coming through and will likely 
trigger a major shock as the skeletons in banks’ closets 
start noisily falling out: banks will be forced to make 
major write-downs that will highlight their capital inad-
equacy. At the same time, the implementation of IFRS 
9 will create a gameable cliff edge, encouraging banks 
to engage in excessive forbearance on other loans that 
will delay loss recognition on those loans and make ulti-
mate losses worse. Therefore some of the skeletons will 
fall out of the cupboard whilst those that can be will be 
pushed further to the back of it. 
25  “Written evidence submitted by Mr. Tim Bush (CAP0006),” published by 
the Treasury Committee Capital Enquiry, April 2017. 
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To make matters worse, this issue has to be seen in the 
context of the EU Commission actively seeking to un-
dermine not just IFRS 9, but to roll back even the weak 
provisioning requirements of IAS 39, i.e., the Commis-
sion is seeking a solution that is worse than IAS 39’s 
incurred loss model! 
The explanation is that some banks have an issue with 
any accounting standards that require them to reveal the 
losses coming through: think of some big German bank 
that has a lot of legacy stuff from the GFC that it still 
hasn’t sorted out. So this bank and others like it lobbied 
Brussels to ensure that IFRS 9 had even weaker pro-
visioning requirements than IAS 39. The Commission 
was then captured by the banking lobby and its solution 
to the problem that tighter provisioning might cause a 
shock by revealing the true position is to weaken exist-
ing provisioning requirements to give banks even more 
scope to kick the can down the road. In fact, the situ-
ation is so bad that in March 2017 even the European 
Banking Authority could no longer stand aside without 
protesting about it.26 
There are also reasons to believe that IFRS 9 will cause 
major problems for future stress tests. A recent Bar-
clays Equity Research Note suggested that a typical 
downturn under IFRS 9 could knock about 300 basis 
26 To quote the EBA: “as currently drafted, the Commission’s response is 
not sufficiently prudent, as it may allow provisions that would exist under IAS 
39 to be subject to the transitional arrangements and therefore added back to 
CET1.” See “EBA publishes Opinion on transitional arrangements and credit risk 
adjustments due to the introduction of IFRS 9,” European Banking Authority, 
March 6th 2017, p. 4. 
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points off the sector’s CET1/RWA ratio, equivalent to 
over 100 basis points knocked off the leverage ratio.27 If 
this estimate is anyway near correct, then a severe stress 
test properly carried out under properly implemented 
IFRS 9 would see a big hit to the stressed leverage ratio 
because of IFRS 9 – and this hit would come on top of 
the hit coming from the stress itself. If the Bank is re-
laxed about IFRS 9, it shouldn’t be – unless it expects 
the Commission to succeed in neutering it. 
THE SETTING OF THE COUNTERCYCLICAL 
CAPITAL BUFFER
There is one last issue that surfaced in the discussion 
that accompanied the release of the Bank stress test 
report: the setting of the Countercylical Capital Buffer 
(CCyB). In March 2016 the FPC announced that the 
CCyB would be raised to 0.5 percent, but in July 2016, 
post the Brexit vote, the FPC announced that that in-
crease would be cancelled before it had been imple-
mented.28 To quote Governor Carney again:
“The FPC was concerned that banks could respond 
to these developments by hoarding capital and re-
stricting lending. The reduction of the CCyB rate 
was intended to reinforce the FPC’s expectation that 
all elements of capital and liquidity buffers are able 
to be drawn on to support the real economy. 
27 See Barclays Equity Research, “IFRS 9- Bigger than Basel IV,” January 9th 
2017.
28 One might add that the earlier “increase” was mostly relabelling of existing 
capital, whereas the subsequent decrease was real.  
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“That position has not changed. In light of the con-
tinued uncertainty around the UK economic outlook 
and the resilience demonstrated in the 2016 stress 
test, the FPC agreed to maintain the CCyB rate at 
0% and that it expects, absent any material change in 
the outlook, to maintain this rate until at least June 
2017.”29
I don’t understand this passage at all. First, banks do 
not ‘hoard’ capital: they issue it. To say that they hoard 
capital is buy into the ‘capital as a rainy day fund’ fal-
lacy that has been debunked by Anat Admati and Mar-
tin Hellwig’s book, The Bankers’ New Clothes and 
in numerous articles elsewhere.30 The same applies to 
statements that banks ‘hold’ or ‘have’ or are ‘required 
to have’ capital.31 The core of the fallacy is it mixes up 
the two sides of the balance sheet. A rainy day fund 
is an asset to a bank and belongs on the Total Assets 
side of its balance sheet, but bank capital is something 
that it issues and belongs on the Total Liabilities and 
Equity side of its balance sheet. Therefore the notion 
of a bank ‘hoarding’ (or ‘holding’ or ‘having’) capital 
29 Governor’s opening remarks, pp.4-5.  
30 See A.Admati and M. Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s wrong 
with Banking and What to Do about It. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press 2013; or Admati and Hellwig, “The Parade of the Bankers’ New Clothes 
Continues: 31 Flawed Claims Debunked,” Stanford Graduate School of Business, 
December 2015. John Cochrane provides an entertaining demolition of this 
and related fallacies on his May 1st 2017 blog posting, “93 words, most of them 
wrong”, available at http://johncochrane.blogspot.co.uk/2017/05/93-words-
most-of-them-word.html
31 See Dr. Carney’s statement from his G20 letter quoted on p. 10 above: “The 
largest banks are required to have as much as ten times more of the highest 
quality capital than before the crisis.” 
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makes no sense. Dr. Carney confuses what banks invest 
in with how they finance themselves. To quote his own 
colleagues: “It can be misleading to think of capital as 
‘held’ or ‘set aside’ by banks; capital is not an asset. 
Rather it is a form of funding – one that can absorb loss-
es that could otherwise threaten a bank’s solvency.”32
In any case, how does relying on plain ‘continued un-
certainty’ justify any CCyB decision, up or down, given 
that uncertainty, like the poor, will always be with us?
Carney also makes it clear that the Bank regarded risks 
as elevated, but then another problem emerges: if risks 
are elevated and the Bank responds by cutting its CCyB 
to zero, then the Bank has no room to reduce the CCyB 
further should those risks materialise. This latter point 
suggests that the FPC seems to have its countercycli-
cal policy upside down. The purpose of the CCyB is to 
counter the cycle: as aggregate credit builds, markets 
boom and risks build up; then the boom breaks, markets 
32 See M. Farag, D. Harland, and D. Nixon, “Bank capital and liquidity,” Bank 
of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2013 Q3, p. 201.
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fall and risks fall.33 The CCyB should rise in the first 
phase to help slow the euphoria as risks increase, and 
then fall in the second phase to ameliorate the pain 
when risks have fallen. Over the last few years markets 
have been booming, so we are presumably still in the 
phase where risks are building up. If so, then the FPC 
should increase the CCyB rather than reduce it. The 
FPC’s ‘countercyclical’ policy is therefore procyclical: 
it is aggravating the problems it is meant to ameliorate! 
At the very least, the Bank should always base its de-
cisions on CCyB settings on a clear statement about 
which phase of the cycle they think we are in: Phase 1 
implying that the decision to be considered is to raise 
the buffer to counter rising risks or Phase 2 implying the 
opposite. However, I suspect they don’t do that because 
they don’t know themselves or because they don’t wish 
to expose their views to criticism: one can imagine the 
fun that critics would have. If I am correct, they would 
be better off abandoning CCyB policy altogether.
33 Consider this quote from a recent BIS document: “The countercyclical capital 
buffer aims to ensure that banking sector capital requirements take account of 
the macro-financial environment in which banks operate. Its primary objective 
is to use a buffer of capital to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of 
protecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit growth 
that have often been associated with the build-up of system-wide risk. Due to 
its countercyclical nature, the countercyclical capital buffer regime may also 
help to lean against the build-up phase of the credit cycle in the first place. In 
downturns, the regime should help to reduce the risk that the supply of credit 
will be constrained by regulatory capital requirements that could undermine the 
performance of the real economy and result in additional credit losses in the 
banking system.” Bank for International Settlements (2016) “Countercyclical 
capital buffer.” July 20. Available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/ccyb/.
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One gets the impression that all that they see is uncer-
tainty, so they think “uncertainty is bad so we should 
ease” and reduce the buffer. However, if that is what 
they do, they are not even attempting to follow counter-
cyclical policy at all: all they have is a policy bias towards 
ease, which is the same bias that we see with unconven-
tional monetary policy for most of the past decade.
MARKET VALUES, ITN AND THE TREASURY 
COMMITTEE
A little over a month after the November 30th 2016 
press conference, ITN’s Joel Hills approached me 
about a feature on the stress tests that he was planning 
to do for News at Ten. He was going to interview Sir 
John Vickers on the market vs. book issue and he asked 
me if I would provide the results that showed how using 
the latest available market values instead of book val-
ues would have affected the results of the Bank’s stress 
tests. Sir John and I had been arguing for some time that 
the Bank should pay much more attention to market 
values, especially when they are lower than book: as of 
early January 2017, average market values were about 
2/3 of average book values on a size-adjusted basis.
Why should we use market values rather than book val-
ues? Because market values being less than book val-
ues signal that the markets do not believe the book val-
ues: they signal that there are expected losses coming 
through that the book values are not picking up. 
The choice of book vs. market values also makes a big 
difference to the results of the stress test: if you use 
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book values in the Bank’s stress test, then only RBS 
fails the test, but if you replace book values by market 
values and make no other changes to the test, then only 
Lloyds passes. So book vs. market values is a big deal.
The programme was aired on January 10th 2017. As 
it happened, the next day there was a meeting of the 
Treasury Committee who were interviewing senior of-
ficials from the Bank, including Governor Carney. The 
subject of the News at Ten report came up in the dis-
cussion and there was a robust exchange of views. The 
Bank witnesses wouldn’t budge an inch, however: there 
was nothing wrong with their stress tests, market values 
are unreliable, they took account of them anyway, Sir 
John and I should have gone to them with our concerns, 
and so forth. (In fact, we had approached them with our 
concerns and our concerns had been dismissed.) They 
also confidently claimed that although they hadn’t seen 
our spreadsheets, they knew that we had made a basic 
double-counting error and they would have put us right 
if we had approached them. 
So not quite a meeting of minds. 
It was eventually agreed that more work needed to be 
done to get to bottom of these issues, and Vickers and 
I were subsequently invited to meet with Bank officials, 
which we did. Regrettably, the details of these meetings 
are confidential.
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KEY THEMES AND ORGANISATION OF
NO STRESS III
In this third report in the ‘No Stress’ series I set out 
why I believe that Vickers and I are demonstrably right 
and the Bank of England is demonstrably wrong on the 
stress tests. In fact, both the stress tests and the Bank’s 
interpretation of their results are riddled with errors 
and misunderstandings, some serious. 
My biggest concern is this: the stress test programme 
does far more harm than good, because it provides false 
risk comfort by suggesting that the banking system is 
resilient when it is clearly not. Put another way, the pro-
gramme is pointless except as an exercise in providing 
false reassurance, which is to say that it is worse than 
useless when dangers are present or even might be pre-
sent. Imagine a ship that was using a radar system that 
could not detect icebergs in plain sight.
I should also explain how No Stress III relates to its pre-
decessors. The first, No Stress: the Flaws in the Bank 
of England’s Stress Testing Programme, was published 
by the Adam Smith Institute in the summer of 2015: it 
provided an overview of regulatory stress testing in the 
U.S. and Europe, and an analysis of the first (2014) UK 
stress test. A second edition, No Stress II: the Flaws in 
the Bank of England’s Stress Testing Programme, was 
published in August 2016: No Stress II was an update 
which covered the more recent European stress tests 
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and the 2015 UK stress tests.34 This report, No Stress 
III: the Flaws in the Bank of England’s 2016 Stress 
Tests, is not a third edition, however. Instead, it focuses 
on the 2016 UK stress tests and does not seek to up-
date the earlier reports. Were I to attempt to do so, the 
report would merely get longer and longer and become 
ever more unwieldy.35  
No Stress III is organised as follows. Chapter Two ex-
amines the market values vs book values issue. Chapter 
Three explains the metrics of capital adequacy. Chap-
ter Four sets out the basics of stress test methodology. 
Chapter Five sets out my analysis of the stress tests: it 
demonstrates that the Bank made a number of errors 
and concludes that, correctly interpreted, the results 
of the 2016 stress tests show that UK banks are still fi-
nancially weak. Chapter Six deflates the Bank’s Janu-
ary 11th evidence to the Treasury Committee. Chapter 
Seven looks at the fatal flaws of regulatory stress testing 
in general and Chapter Eight examines what should be 
done about the stress-testing programme – and my ad-
vice is to scrap it.
34 See K. Dowd, No Stress II: The Flaws in the Bank of England’s Stress Testing 
Programme, Adam Smith Institute, London, August 3rd 2016, available at 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56eddde762cd9413e151ac92/t/579f53
b66b8f5ba10895862b/1470059502224/No+Stress+II.
35 Any reader who wishes for more information on regulatory stress testing 
might also consider looking at my Math Gone Mad: Regulatory Risk Modeling by 
the Federal Reserve, Cato Policy Analysis No. 754, Cato Institute, Washington 
D.C., September 2015, available at https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/
pubs/pdf/pa754_1.pdf.
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2. Market versus 
book values
“From the time of Abraham to 1938 in the USA and the traditions that 
preceded it, banks were supposed to keep their books using market-value 
accounting. The Finance textbooks say that market value is, after all, real 
value, while book is historic cost, which is not real value. In 1938, the 
Fed led an effort, blessed by FDR, to impose book value accounting on 
the banking system to enable the authorities to dispose of failed banks’ 
assets without triggering automatic markdowns throughout the rest of 
the banking system...
“Now here we are. Jamie Dimon argued in 2008 that his bank (and prob-
ably Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo), did NOT need the capital pro-
vided by TARP. My argument is that, using market value accounting, 
they all needed the capital, even JP Morgan, Chase, Goldman and Wells.
“It’s a tough fight, but I think market value is worth defending.”36
Walker Todd
36 Personal correspondence. 
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MARKET VERSUS BOOK: WHICH IS BETTER?
Book values are those reported for accounting purposes 
in banks’ annual reports and interim financial state-
ments. Market values are those given or implied in mar-
ket prices, e.g., stock prices. So which is better?
The truth is that there is no universally correct answer, 
but there should be a presumption in favour of market 
values especially when market values are lower than 
book values. 
Suppose that a bank has an asset with a specified book 
value, e.g., a branch or a financial asset, and the bank 
wishes to sell that asset. In these circumstances, the 
book value is irrelevant and what matters is what it 
can get for the asset, i.e., the market value. Similarly, 
suppose a bank wishes to issue shares and to make the 
example concrete, suppose that the book value of the 
share is £1 but the market value is 50p. If the bank is-
sues a new share, then it gets no more than 50p for it 
and the book value is irrelevant. More generally, when 
it comes to buying and selling an asset, the book value is 
irrelevant and it is the market value that matters 
However, there are occasions where book values are 
more useful. For example, suppose a financial institu-
tion holds a AAA-rated bond that it intends to hold to 
maturity. The price of this bond will fluctuate from day 
to day in response in changes in interest rates, but as 
far as the financial institution is concerned, these short-
term fluctuations are noise, as the stream of payments 
promised by the bond is (more or less) known, assuming 
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no big adverse credit shock. In such circumstances, it 
might make sense for the bank to value the bond using 
some accrual, i.e., book-value, method, and to ignore 
the market value – unless it might become necessary to 
consider selling the bond. 
It is often also the case market values are to be preferred 
because they are more informative. From this perspec-
tive, one might go as far as to say that as a general though 
by no means universal rule, market values are more ap-
propriate because market values reflect information not 
in the book values, such as the impact of news or mar-
ket participants’ perceptions of problems that are not 
reflected in the book values. Most financial economists 
would also agree with this claim. Whilst few now sub-
scribe to the strong-form Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
(EMH) belief that share prices are fully informative, few 
subscribe to the polar opposite extreme and claim that 
share prices are completely uninformative. 
These considerations undermine an objection some-
times made against the use of market values: namely, 
that a belief in the informativeness of market values 
presupposes a belief in strong-form EMH. This objec-
tion is a straw man, however. I share the scepticism 
about strong-form EMH myself, but it does not follow 
that market values or share prices must be totally unin-
formative. Weaker forms of EMH have merit.
A second (and valid) objection to market values is that 
there are circumstances in which market values – includ-
ing bank share prices – can fluctuate excessively. Banks’ 
market values were clearly too high in the run-up to the 
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GFC and they can undershoot in the heat of a crisis. 
For example, the UK merchant bank Hill Samuel expe-
rienced a period of excessively low share prices in the 
highly volatile environment after the Herstatt Bank fail-
ure in 1974. At one point, its market value fell to about a 
quarter of its par value before bouncing back.
Hill Samuel was a sound bank that was caught up in a 
storm, but it does not follow that any bank experiencing 
a low share price is another Hill Samuel. Some banks 
experience low share prices for good reason: because 
the market correctly perceives them to be at risk of 
insolvency. Think of Northern Rock in 2007, Citi and 
Dexia in 2008, and so on. In such cases, market prices 
correctly signalled problems ahead. 
Sir John Vickers makes a similar point in his letter to 
Mark Carney of December 5th last year: 
“… market-to-book ratios for some major UK banks 
are well below 1. That indicates market doubt about 
the accuracy of book measures. To the extent that 
such doubts are correct, stress tests based on book 
values are undermined.
“The Bank appears to take the view that low market-
to-book ratios [for UK banks] are down to dimmed 
prospects of future profitability rather than problems 
with current asset books. But such a view is hard to 
sustain for banks with [price-to-book] ratios below 1. 
There is, at the very least, a serious possibility that 
low market-to-book ratios are signalling underlying 
problems with book values. This certainly cannot be 
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dismissed, especially when one is examining the abil-
ity of the system to bear stress – an exercise that calls 
for prudence.”1 
To me this statement is self-evidently correct, so I 
was surprised that in his reply letter Governor Car-
ney sought to challenge it: he continued to defend the 
Bank’s earlier position that low market-to-book is due 
to low future profitability and dismissed Vickers’ con-
cerns about the possibility that markets might be signal-
ling deeper issues with the book values. 
I also have to ask myself how the Bank of England can 
be so sure (and prudently so!) that its interpretation is 
correct and Vickers’ is not. 
Governor Carney’s response does not address his con-
cerns and in any case raises further issues. One prob-
lem is that dimmed future earnings prospects to some 
extent reflect the Bank’s own Zero Interest Rate Policy 
(ZIRP), which has the effect of making banks’ core busi-
ness model unprofitable, because that model depends 
on the Net Interest Margin that ZIRP pulls down. 
There is also another problem. As Tim Bush observed: 
“there is a circularity in Dr. Carney’s reference to 
low future profitability being the drag down of price/
book. 
1 “Supplementary market-based stress test results,” letter from Sir John Vickers 
to Governor Mark Carney, December 5th 2016.
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“The counter argument is that low future profit-
ability is merely the result of deferring losses to the 
future, by not writing down the existing book and/or
“‘Low future profitability’ implies banks will be 
knowingly writing sub-standard business going for-
wards, which is irrational. And if it were true, the 
Bank should stop it.
“I think the low future returns are the unwinding 
of currently overstated positions. Be it loans, be it 
derivatives.”2  
Mr. Bush is correct. The problem is in large part due 
to IAS 39’s backward looking ‘incurred loss’ loan loss 
model. Markets will price the book down to its expected 
recovery value and hence IFRS is bound to cause a dis-
location between the book and lower market expecta-
tions. By contrast, pre-IFRS accounting rules forbade 
by statute the carrying of loans at more than their re-
coverable amount. The IFRS system plays to manage-
ment incentives to run with as little capital as possible. 
Even worse, it encourages management to hide losses, 
and hiding losses is false accounting and false account-
ing is a criminal offence.3 The banks should therefore 
book the losses now and get it over with – and the Bank 
of England should have a contingency plan to deal with 
the resulting shock to banks’ capital ratios. We have 
been waiting for nearly a decade for them to take the hit 
2 Action Fraud. http://actionfraud.police.uk/fraud-protection/false-
accounting-fraud
3 Personal correspondence.
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and their reluctance to do so is one of the reasons why 
the recovery from the recession has been so weak and 
protracted.
Vickers’  (March 3rd 2017) response to Carney is, to my 
way of thinking, unanswerable:
“The regulation of banks is based on accounting 
measures of capital. A major source of risk to finan-
cial stability is that capital is mis-measured by the ac-
counting standards used in regulation. In that case, 
bank regulation that allows high (e.g. 25 times) lev-
erage relative to accounting (or ‘book’) measures of 
capital is more fragile than may appear.
“An instance of this point is that stress tests based 
on book values are themselves vulnerable to errone-
ous measurement of capital, because those measure-
ments are their starting point. Furthermore, bank 
regulation nowadays counts convertible debt instru-
ments such as CoCos as akin to equity capital, but 
the conditions in which they convert to common eq-
uity (or are written down) are also dependent on ac-
counting measures of capital. In short, a lot is riding 
on book values being reasonably accurate…
“None of this is to say that markets necessarily value 
assets accurately. Rather, the point is that low price-
to-book ratios, especially when below one, signal a serious 
possibility that book values are inaccurate, and hence 
that the basis for regulation (not just in stress tests) 
is open to question.”
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Market values are not always reliable, but 
when [market values] are low, systematic attention 
should be paid to them, and transparently so.4  (My ital-
ics)
LOW MARKET VALUATIONS IMPLY THAT 
BANKS ARE LESS RESILIENT
A third objection to the use of market values was put by 
the BoE in its March 2017 submission to the Treasury 
Committee’s capital enquiry:
“Low market valuations can reflect a number of 
things, all of which lead to weak expected profitabil-
ity. But, crucially, different reasons for weak profit-
ability can have quite different implications for a 
bank’s resilience. This is because they have differ-
ent impacts on the value of the bank’s assets if it 
needed to sell them to pay for losses elsewhere in the 
business.”5 
The Bank then illustrated this point by comparing two 
hypothetical banks with the same cash flows – one is 
efficient but has poor assets, the other is inefficient but 
has good assets, and could sell some if needs be.
4 J. Vickers, “Response to the Treasury Select Committee’s Capital Inquiry: 
Recovery and Resolution,” March 3rd 2017, pp. 7, 8 and 12. 
5 Quoted from Sir John Vickers’ letter to Alex Brazier, April 26th 2017, copies 
of which are available on request from Sir John. 
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The Bank’s argument is a distinction without a differ-
ence, however. Weak expected profitability – whatever 
the cause, whether hidden losses or poor business mod-
els – is a potentially serious financial stability issue and 
it’s as basic as that. As Vickers then pointed out in his 
April 26th 2017 letter to Alex Brazier:
“A holder of the BoE view, if I may put it that way, 
can however respond by noting … that the inefficient 
bank with good assets can sell some. If such a bank 
alone faced difficulties – so in the absence of system-
ic stress – this would be a reasonable answer.
“But it is harder to see how asset sales could be a sat-
isfactory response in conditions of systemic stress, a 
typical feature of which is precisely the inability of 
banks to sell assets except at distressed prices. This 
is the well-known ‘fire sale’ problem…”
The gist of this problem that a bank that suffers a large 
loss might be forced to reduce its asset holdings by sell-
ing assets at fire-sale prices. If other banks must revalue 
their assets at these temporarily low market values, 
then the first sale can set off a cascade of fire sales that 
inflicts losses on many institutions and thereby creates 
a systemic problem. 
“This kind of risk, I suggest, should be central to 
thinking about financial stability, and to stress tests. 
Financial stability policy should take a prudent ap-
proach as a general matter. In particular, it should 
not place reliance on banks being able to sell assets 
in crises at good prices. While that might cope with 
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an idiosyncratic shock affecting one bank, it will not 
do in a systemic crisis. But systemic crisis risk is the 
principal risk that regulation should guard against. 
The prudent stress test question, then, is whether 
the bank can meet its obligations without resorting 
to asset sales. It is not whether it can do so on the as-
sumption that assets can be sold at good prices.
“In sum, low market valuations imply less resilience 
even when the possibility of asset sales is allowed for. 
Tests of resilience that rely on resort to asset sales 
are flawed because, as experience shows, in a sys-
temic crisis it may well be impossible to realise full 
value from asset sales.”
Mr. Bush also offers a powerful rebuttal of his own:
“Essentially, from the perspective of a shareholder 
providing capital, the BoE’s second example (good 
current balance sheet, poor future returns) is really 
an admission that a bank as a whole is one big im-
paired asset. Nothing resilient about that. Particular-
ly, no incentive to refinance it if it incurs unexpected 
losses for example. New investment won’t achieve 
an appropriate return.” 
The BoE’s line is a bit like saying British Leyland 
was resilient if the factories were brand new.6  
6 Personal correspondence
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MARKET VALUES AND THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS
Another objection to the use of market values was made 
by Alex Brazier in his evidence to the Treasury Com-
mittee on January 11th 2017: 
“…if you had [relied on market cap values] before 
the crisis, you would have been led completely astray 
… You would have been led to the conclusion that 
the British banking system was remarkably resilient, 
and, as forecasting errors go, that would have been 
quite a good one.”7
Really? Consider the chart on the next page, which 
shows how the price-to-book (P2B) ratios of interna-
tional banks fell before crisis. The P2B ratios for UK 
banks are similar. 
7 Treasury Committee, “Oral evidence: Bank of England Financial Stability 
Reports,” HC 549, Wednesday 11 January 2017, answer to Q173.
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Chart 2.1:  
Price-to-Book Ratios of Banks Internationally
Source: IMF Financial Stability Report, October 2016, Figure 1.11, panel 1.
Then consider the next chart, which shows the ratios of 
market capitalisation to the book value of equity for two 
sets of international banks, the “crisis” ones that failed, 
required assistance or were taken over in distressed 
conditions, and the “non-crisis” ones that weathered 
the storm.
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Chart 2.2: 
Market Capitalisation to Book-Value of Equity(a),(b)
Source: Haldane, 2011, Chart 8.
Notes to Chart:
(a) “Crisis” banks are a set of major financial institutions which in autumn 2008 either 
failed, required government capital or were taken over in distressed circumstances. 
These are RBS, HBOS, Lloyds TSB, Bradford & Bingley, Alliance & Leicester, Citi-
group, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Merrill Lynch, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Gold-
man Sachs, ING Group, Dexia and Commerzbank. The chart shows an unweighted av-
erage for those institutions in the sample for which data are available on the given day.
(b) The “no crisis” institutions are HSBC, Barclays, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan, San-
tander, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale, BBVA, Banco 
Popular, Banco Sabadell, Unicredit, Banca Popolare di Milano, Royal Bank of Canada, 
National Australia Bank, Commonwealth Bank of Australia and ANZ Banking Group. 
The chart shows an unweighted average for those banks in the sample for which data 
are available on the given day.
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It is, thus, clear that markets were signalling problems 
with the banks and they correctly identified the weakest 
banks too. In the UK case, they also correctly identified 
in advance the two biggest UK problem banks, HBOS 
and RBS.8 
Mr. Brazier omits to mention that the Bank was rely-
ing on Basel model-based book values that completely 
missed the impending meltdown and he does not offer 
any alternative that would have credibly worked better. 
He also omits to mention the Bank’s own record on this 
issue. The ‘British banking system is resilient’ is exactly 
the message that the Bank itself was putting out before the 
GFC. Not only did the Bank itself have no inkling of the 
GFC before it hit, but in the early stages of the GFC 
and even after the run on Northern Rock, it was still 
reassuring us that there was little to worry about and 
that the UK banking system was more than adequately 
capitalised. These reassurances proved to be as wrong 
as wrong can be. 
As the previous two charts demonstrate, there is con-
siderable evidence that market values did provide some 
warning and in any case performed better on this crite-
rion than book values did. To quote from a careful anal-
ysis of this issue by the Bank’s own chief economist, 
Andy Haldane:
8 See, e.g., Chart 2.73 on p. 153 of the FCA/PRA report The Failure of HBOS 
plc.
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“Market-based measures of capital offered clear 
advance signals of impending distress. … Replacing 
the book value of capital with its market value low-
ers errors by a half, often much more. Market values 
provide both fewer false positives and more reliable 
advance warnings of future banking distress. 
“… market-based solvency metrics perform credit-
ably against first principles: they appear to offer the 
potential for simple, timely and robust control of a 
complex financial web.”9
It is also helpful to compare their respective track re-
cords at predicting subsequently realised bank failures: 
markets have sometimes got it right and sometimes got 
it wrong, but bank regulators have always got it wrong. 
Their failure prediction rate is exactly zero percent. 
Even chicken entrails would have had a better success 
rate than whatever model or crystal ball regulators any-
where use to peer into the future and no rational person 
should ever believe the forecasts of a group of forecast-
ers with a zero percent success rate.
The former President and CEO of BB&T Bank, John 
Allison, confirms this point and explains why:
“One observation in my 40-year career at BB&T: I 
don’t know a single time when federal regulators—
primarily the FDIC—actually identified a significant 
bank failure in advance. Regulators are always the 
9 A. G. Haldane, “Capital discipline,” speech given at the American Economic 
Association, Denver, January 9th 2011, p. 8. 
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last ones to the party after everybody in the market 
(the other bankers) know something is going on. … 
regulators have a 100 percent failure rate. Indeed, in 
my experience, whenever they get involved with a 
bank that is struggling, they always make it worse—
because they don’t know how to run a bank.”10
But I digress.
So what it comes down to is that if the Bank does not use 
market values for the stress tests, then it should have a 
good reason not to. In terms of a concrete operating cri-
terion, the natural answer is provided by the Principle 
of Prudence, which suggests that it should value using 
the lesser of book values and market values. 
To rely on book values when market values are lower 
than book values is simply imprudent – and central 
bankers are famously prudent. 
Whilst on the subject of prudence, wouldn’t it be wise 
for the Bank to acknowledge at least the possibility that 
outsiders – not just Vickers and I, but also Anat Admati, 
Tim Bush, James Ferguson and Gordon Kerr, to name 
a few, and even Mervyn King, who has pointedly failed 
to endorse the stress tests – might be right or that we 
might at least have a point? 
So answer me this, Bank of England: you say that your 
stress tests show that the UK banking system is sound. 
10 J. Allison, “Market discipline beats regulatory discipline,” Cato Journal, 
24(2), Spring-Summer 2014, p. 345. 
NO STRESS III 53
53
But how can you be confident in such assertions, when 
your stress tests are based on book-value numbers and 
when the markets are clearly signalling that something 
is wrong with those book values? 
To cut to the chase, how can you expect the public to 
believe your narrative when the markets don’t?
THE VICKERS PROPOSAL FOR PARALLEL 
MARKET AND BOOK VALUE TESTS
So let me endorse Vickers’ suggestion for a compro-
mise, as set out in his December 5th letter to Governor 
Carney. If the tests are to continue the Bank should pre-
sent both sets of results and let readers make up their 
own minds. As he wrote:
“[My] proposal is not that market-based tests for 
such banks should replace tests of the kind that the 
Bank has run. The request is merely that the Bank 
supplements its results with market-based results. 
“That would inform public debate on a matter of 
great importance for economic policy, and it would 
enhance the transparency and accountability of the 
Bank.”
Yet the Bank still insists that it should not publish any 
such results because – to quote Governor Carney in his 
December 19th reply to Vickers’ letter – to do so might 
confuse 
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“the Bank’s communication around its stress tests. 
If we publish two sets of results that give different 
messages, people might struggle to understand what 
we are trying to say about the resilience of the bank-
ing system.”
But as Vickers responded:
“A stress test is primarily a test of the resilience 
of the banks, not a communications exercise. …. 
Considerations of transparency and accountability 
should therefore far outweigh the regulator’s com-
munications agenda.”11
A bigger problem is that Carney takes the Bank’s cred-
ibility for granted and then focusses on making the mes-
sage simple for the audience. Such reasoning puts the 
cart before the horse. Instead, the key to effective com-
munication is credibility and credibility must be earned 
and maintained, not presumed. 
The Bank does not help its own credibility by brushing 
aside good outside advice, however politely. Publishing 
market-based results could allay any possible concerns 
that it might be trying to window-dress the banking sys-
tem and itself in the best possible light. The Bank would 
still be able to give its own commentary explaining why 
it thinks that the book-value results are more credible 
than the market-value results. 
11 Quoted in Vickers Capital Enquiry testimony. 
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It is also a mistake for the Bank to under-estimate its 
intended audience, who should be presumed to be capa-
ble of making up their own minds when presented with 
the evidence and be treated with appropriate respect. 
The Bank repeatedly makes the mistake of ‘oversim-
plifying’ its message and then making claims that turn 
out later to have been way off the mark, thereby under-
mining its own credibility again and again. It made that 
mistake when it reassured us before the financial crisis 
that the banking system was strong. It made that mis-
take when it told us during the Brexit referendum that a 
Leave vote could trigger a recession and that Brexit was 
the biggest single risk facing the UK economy, and it is 
making the same mistake again with the stress tests. 
To paraphrase Hubert Humphrey on propaganda, a 
perhaps not entirely unrelated subject: the Bank of Eng-
land’s message, to be effective, must be believed. To be 
believed, it must be credible. At the moment, it is not. 
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3. Measuring 
Capital Adequacy
We measure capital adequacy by means of the ratio of 
core capital to the total exposure or amount ‘at risk’. 
Let’s first consider the numerator in this ratio.
Measuring core capital: only the best 
will do
For capital adequacy purposes we want a measure of 
core capital, not total shareholder equity or the market 
capitalisation. By core capital, we mean the ‘fire-re-
sistant’ (or loss-absorbing) capital available to support 
the bank in the heat of a crisis. There are a number of 
different core capital measures available, however, and 
some are more reliable than others. Their reliability is 
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in inverse proportion to their broadness: the broader 
the capital measure, the more ‘soft’ capital it includes 
and the less reliable it is. Why is this, you might ask? Be-
cause ‘soft’ capital instruments like Deferred Tax As-
sets (DTAs), intangibles and debt can’t absorb losses, 
which begs the question of why were they allowed into 
Basel II regulatory capital definitions in the first place. 
But, unfortunately, whilst it improves on Basel II in 
this respect, Basel III still allows certain softer capital 
instruments to be included in measures of core capital 
– and so, as we shall see, an important lesson from the 
financial crisis has still not been properly learned. 
With any capital adequacy metrics, a major concern is 
cheating or ‘gaming’ to use the more polite language 
used in this area: bankers don’t ‘cheat’ except on LI-
BOR, they ‘game’. In the case of the capital measure, 
the concerns relate to bankers’ ability to exploit loop-
holes (e.g., by stuffing less expensive-to-issue softer 
capital items into the core capital measures approved by 
regulators) and with their lobbying to create such loop-
holes in the first place. 
Tangible Common Equity
From a first principles perspective, the ideal core capi-
tal measure is Tangible Common Equity (TCE). The 
word ‘tangible’ implies that one deducts from market 
cap and/or book value intangibles (such as goodwill and 
DTAs) that cannot be deployed to help it in a solvency 
crisis. The acid test is this: if the bank were to fail to-
morrow, what would the relevant capital instruments be 
worth? Goodwill  and DTAs would be worth nothing. 
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The word ‘common’ implies that one deducts items like 
preferred shares and hybrid capital to which ordinary 
shares are subordinate. 
The importance of TCE as the ultimate core capital 
measure was highlighted in a 2011 speech by former 
senior Federal Reserve official Daniel Tarullo. When 
reflecting on the experience of the GFC, Governor 
Tarullo observed that: 
“...at least some of the instruments that qualified as 
“Tier 1 capital” [a core capital measure under Basel 
II] for regulatory purposes were not reliable buffers 
against losses, at least not on a going concern basis. 
It is instructive that during the height of the crisis, 
counterparties and other market actors looked almost ex-
clusively to the amount of tangible common equity held 
by financial institutions in evaluating the creditwor-
thiness and overall stability of those institutions [and 
essentially ignored any broader capital measures 
altogether].”12 (My italics)
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital
Amongst the measures used by regulators, the narrow-
est and the least ‘polluted’ by softer capital instruments 
is Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital. CET1 is equal 
to common shares plus realised earnings, accumulated 
other items and disclosed reserves and certain not too 
12 D. K. Tarullo, “The Evolution of Capital Regulation,”speech to the Clearing 
House Business Meeting and Conference, New York, November 9, 2011.
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clear regulatory adjustments.13 But we should remem-
ber that even CET1 capital materially exaggerates the 
true common equity figure owing to the substantial por-
tions of retained bank earnings attributable to mark-to-
market derivatives ‘profits’; these latter are hoped-for 
profits that have not yet been realised.
Tier 1 capital
The Basel III regulations also specify a second some-
what broader core capital measure, Tier 1 capital. Tier 
1 capital is equal to CET1 capital plus Additional Tier 
1 (AT1) capital. Capital instruments are eligible to be 
classified as AT1 if they meet certain conditions, e.g., 
that they be issued and paid-in, be perpetual and be sub-
ordinate to depositors, general creditors and subordi-
nated debt.14 In practice, the AT1 instruments that mat-
ter most are Contingent Convertible bonds, known as 
CoCos, that convert to equity under certain conditions. 
CoCo capital instruments ought not to be regarded as 
on any par with CET1: 
• CoCos have not been tested in a major crisis. 
• CoCos send out a distress signal that can aggra-
vate a crisis, i.e., they may be of no use when need-
ed most. For example, it would be difficult, to say 
13 For a more complete definition of CET1 capital, see Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems” (Basel Committee, June 2011), p. 13. 
14 For more on the qualifying conditions for AT1 capital, see Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for 
more resilient banks and banking systems” (Basel Committee, June 2011), p. 15. 
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the least, for regulators to authorize the bail-in of a 
systemically important bank, for fear that doing so 
might itself trigger a systemic crisis. 
• CoCos create the prospect of ‘death spirals’ 
and the danger that they might trigger or amplify a 
broader crisis as the CoCo market collapses. Once it 
became clear that triggers might soon be breached, 
investors would sell CoCos and possibly bank stock 
too.15   And once one bail-in occurs, there is a danger 
that investors will run from weaker banks, creating 
not just liquidity stress, but a broader crisis too. 
• CoCos are procyclical and their use by regulators 
undermines their efforts to counter the cycle.16 
• CoCos arguably displace the most advantageous 
form of recapitalization, which is new funds from ex-
isting shareholders. To rely on CoCo’s is to accept 
that a bank may not even be an attractive investment 
proposition for its existing shareholders. 
Further doubts about their reliability arise from recent 
experience. In Italy, the adverse public reaction to regu-
lators bailing-in CoCo investors in late 2015 has made au-
thorities reluctant to do the same again, e.g., with MPS. 
In February last year, falls in the prices of Deutsche 
Bank’s CoCos triggered concerns that Deutsche might 
fail and cast doubt on the ability of CoCos to support 
a major systemic bank in a crisis. As a consequence, 
even ECB regulators have been having second thoughts 
15 See also, e.g., Tracy Alloway, “An explanatory CoCo death spiral,” Financial 
Times Alphaville, March 8th 2011. 
16 J. Zeng, “Contingent Capital Structure,” London School of Economics 
Working Paper, January 1st 2014.
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about relying on them.17 And the CoCos’ one supposed 
success story - the June 2017 bailing-in of CoCo inves-
tors in Banco Popular in Spain – suggests that, to the 
extent they helped at all, CoCos only worked as gone-
concern loss-absorbency for a non-systemic bank. How-
ever, any measure of core capital is meant to be going 
concern capital that supports a bank before it fails
One might also ask who would be holding these instru-
ments and how the discipline would operate. The bank-
ing system can hardly be recapitalized by banks hold-
ing each others’ CoCos. Retail investors can be ruled 
out too: the Bank of England regards CoCos as so risky 
that it bans retail investors from holding them. Pension 
funds are another possibility, but they have to operate 
within risk tolerance limits that would sensibly preclude 
instruments as risky as CoCos and one can imagine the 
outcry if they were to suffer major losses on CoCos that 
were bailed-in. Then there are hedge funds and private 
equity groups with high risk tolerance, but it is difficult 
to see these as stable long-term investors. It is therefore 
difficult to see what social usefulness CoCos can serve. 
17 M. Arnold and T. Hale, “ECB is having second thoughts on ‘coco’ bonds,” 
Financial Times, April 24th 2016.
One other concern is that CoCos create the possibility of price manipulation 
and hence gaming around triggers. To quote Martin Taylor from the FPC: “I 
worry that CoCos may be subject to potentially destablising manipulation by 
convertible arbitrageurs …” See M. Taylor, “The fence and the pendulum,” 
speech to the International Association of Credit Portfolio Managers, London 
May 22nd 2015, or S. Sundaresen and Z. Wang (2010) “On the design of 
contingent capital with market triggers,” New York Fed Staff Report No. 448. 
However, such concerns are largely theoretical in Europe, because European 
CoCos must have book value triggers. I thank Wande McCunn for this 
clarification.
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On the other hand, they would appear to be ideal ve-
hicles for investors who wish to speculate on the view 
that, when push comes to shove in a major crisis, then 
central banks wouldn’t dare bail-in investors who had 
bet against them. 
Even the Bank itself has expressed doubts about Co-
Cos. To quote Box 3 of its June 2014 Financial Stability 
Report, there are 
“a number of issues concerning how this new and 
untested form of capital will work to mitigate risks to 
financial stability …
“While AT1 can potentially increase CET1 of banks 
under a stress, a sharp market reaction following a 
trigger event, or as understanding of the features and 
risks of AT1 instruments evolve, could limit banks’ 
ability to raise further capital and affect confidence 
in the banking system. It could also impose signifi-
cant losses on holders of AT1 instruments, some of 
which may be systemically important. … [W]ith only 
limited information on the investor base available at 
present, it remains difficult to assess precisely this 
risk for financial stability.”
As Vickers noted in his Capital Enquiry evidence:
“… even for AT1 capital, which regulation treats as 
akin to common equity, there are questions about 
investor understanding, market liquidity, the possi-
bility of downward share price spirals (if the trigger 
were a market price), the credibility of conversion (if 
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the trigger is a regulatory value, as in fact) and the 
corresponding risk that regulatory values will be ma-
nipulated or relaxed (e.g. by delaying asset impair-
ments or by reducing risk weights) to forestall con-
version.
“Unless conversion is triggered well above levels 
at which resolution becomes an issue, the theoreti-
cal benefit of Cocos as going-concern capital could 
be evaporated. But the EU Capital Requirements 
Regulation requires a minimum trigger level of only 
5.125% of CET1 capital in terms of RWAs. The PRA 
requires UK banks to have a minimum trigger level 
of 7% of CET1 capital, which is better but not a high 
figure, especially when the possibility of regulatory 
mis-measurement is allowed for.”18 
Thus, CoCos are also unreliable because their triggers 
are very low and are based on questionable regulatory 
and accounting measures. 
A leading expert in this field, Ayowande McCunn, in-
forms me that the trigger probably needs to be at least 
11% of CET1 to RWA for the CoCo to be a going con-
cern instrument, the point being to recapitalize banks 
before they fail.  If the trigger is too low, CoCos involve 
forbearance incentives that undermine this primary 
purpose. As he wrote in a recent working paper:
18 Capital Enquiry evidence, p. 4.
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“CoCos were designed by regulators to absorb losses 
prior to resolution to create incentives for stakehold-
ers to monitor. However, CoCo stakeholders have 
incentives to forbear (delay triggering CoCos). This 
incentive means that CoCos may be triggered as part 
of resolution (or other insolvency process) rather 
than being triggered in advance. 
“In fact, if CoCos are triggered as part of resolu-
tion then they are unlikely to create incentives for 
stakeholders to monitor. As a consequence, it is dif-
ficult to justify the existence of CoCos as regulatory 
[core] capital. Accordingly, it might be argued that 
CoCos operate, in an economic sense, in a similar 
way to preference shares with tax deductible interest 
payments.”19 
To quote former Bank Deputy Governor Andrew Bailey 
in his 2014 speech: 
“The big lesson from this history [of innovative cap-
ital instruments being included in regulatory meas-
ures of core capital] is that a going concern capital 
instrument must unambiguously be able to absorb 
losses when the bank is a going concern. Apologies 
for stating the blindingly obvious, but history pain-
fully demonstrates why it is important to state the 
obvious.”20 (My italics)
19 A. McCunn, “Forbearance Incentives: Undermining the distinction between 
going and gone-concern capital” SSRN Working Paper, 5th April 2016. 
20 A. Bailey, “The capital adequacy of banks: today’s issues and what we have 
learned from the past,” speech to Bloomberg, London, 10 July 2014, p. 4.
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Then there is the point that CoCos cannot be relied 
upon to work in a systemic crisis:
“Bail-in securities may make sense for an idiosyn-
cratic bank failure—like the 1995 collapse of Baring 
Brothers, which was the result of a single rogue trad-
er. But they do not make sense in the more common 
and intractable case where many banks get into trou-
ble at roughly the same time as the assets they own 
go bad. On such occasions these securities, which 
may also have encouraged excessive lending, either 
will inappropriately shift the burden of bank resolu-
tion onto ordinary pensioners or, if held by others, 
will bring forward and spread a crisis. Either way 
they will probably end up costing taxpayers no less 
and maybe more. In this regard, fool’s gold is an apt 
description. … Either we need real gold – more eq-
uity capital – or not. Fool’s gold is no alternative…
“Bail-in securities are not the silver bullet… they 
will likely make matters worse. If more gold plating 
of bank capital is what is required, then this fool’s 
gold will not do.”21 (Avinash Persaud)
This difference between real gold and iron pyrites is ex-
actly the point: CoCo instruments are not of the same 
quality as CET1 and therefore Tier 1 capital should 
never be used as a measure of core capital. 
21 A. Persaud, “Why bail-in securities are fool’s gold,” Peterson Institute for 
International Economics Policy Brief PB14-23, November 2014.
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Finally, there is also a danger that the use of Tier 1 capi-
tal and hence dependence on CoCos will leave the fi-
nancial system exposed to much the same problems as 
its dependence on hybrid instruments produced in the 
GFC. 
To quote a speech by Bank Deputy Governor Sir Jon 
Cunliffe in 2014: 
“The market in 2008 and 2009 clearly did not be-
lieve either the numbers for bank capital or for bank 
assets. Capital was not just pure equity. Tier 1 capital 
also included so-called ‘hybrid’ capital instruments 
– debt that was supposed to convert to equity to 
absorb losses. However, the ability of these instru-
ments to absorb losses proved to be illusory. …
“We have tightened up on the required quality of 
regulatory capital. The ‘hybrid’ debt instruments 
that proved not to be loss-absorbing no longer count 
as Tier 1 capital.”22
He omits to point out that CoCos, which are allowed to 
account for up to a quarter of Tier 1 capital, are them-
selves a form of hybrid capital and share many of the fea-
tures of the pre-GFC hybrids that melted down during 
the GFC when they were needed. It would imprudent, 
to say the least, to assume that we can rely on modern 
CoCos when their chocolate teapot antecedents didn’t 
work the last time. 
22 Cunliffe, op. cit., p. 1.
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And so we have a lot of good reasons why we should 
never use Tier 1 as a core capital measure.
MEASURING THE AMOUNT AT RISK
Then there is the denominator in the capital ratio, the 
total exposure or total amount ‘at risk’.
3.2.1 Risk weighted assets
The exposure measure long favoured is the so-called 
‘Risk Weighted Assets’ (RWAs) measure. Indeed, we 
can even say that this principle of Risk-Weighted Assets 
was the key design feature of the Basel system from its 
inception with the original Basel Accord – now known 
as Basel I – in 1988. At first sight, it seems to make sense 
to have risk-adjusted capital requirements but in prac-
tice the adjustments create many more problems than 
they solve. 
The way RWAs work is simple. Every asset is given an 
arbitrary fixed ‘risk weight’ that is usually between 0% 
and 100% but in unusual cases more. The ‘risk-weight-
ed’ asset is then equal to the risk weight times the size 
of the position.23
In the most egregious case, OECD government debt 
– including, at least until recently, Greek government 
debt – is assumed to be riskless and therefore attracts 
23 If you think that these ‘risk weights’ have no relationship to any reasonable 
sense of the riskiness of these assets, you would be right: this methodology is 
unsound in principle, and people have pointed this problem out ever since ‘risk 
weights’ were invented. 
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a risk weight of zero; bank holdings of such debt then 
attract a zero capital requirement.24 The debt of OECD 
governments would then be given a zero risk weight on 
the presumption that it is riskless whereas commercial 
debt would be given the full risk weight of 100%. Risk 
weights on mortgage loans were also very low. These 
zero or low risk weights encouraged banks to load up 
on such assets and were a key aggravating factor in the 
European banking crisis – a classic case of political ex-
pediency leading to predictable disaster.
The result is to create artificially low ‘Risk Weighted 
Asset’ measures that are much lower than total assets. 
To give an idea, the big 7 banks’ 2016 Annual Reports 
suggest that the average ratio of RWA to total assets for 
UK banks was a mere 31.8 percent, and one institution 
– the Nationwide - had a RWA to total assets ratio of 
just under 16.5 percent. So either these banks have in-
deed taken very low risks or they are just very good at 
playing the risk-weighting game, and the evidence sug-
gests the latter. 25
24 I believe the zero risk-weighting of Greek government debt is now under 
revision by the Basel Committee, six years after the riskiness of Greek 
government debt exploded on the scene in 2011. 
25 James Ferguson informs me that the risk weighting game is now crowded 
into mortgage risk weights, which across Europe tend to average around 11-12 
percent, having been 25 percent pre-crisis and 35 percent in the standardised 
Basel III framework. Only large banks are allowed to use their Internal Ratings-
Based (IRB) models to manipulate their risk weights in this way, however. 
Pre-crisis the banks had half their RWAs in mortgage assets, but have about 
two-thirds in mortgage assets now. They then use their IRB models to change 
their assumptions to make those assets as safe as they wish them to be. These 
considerations suggest that institutions such as Lloyds and the Nationwide could 
be highly exposed to a housing crisis. The fact that the stress tests largely missed 
this exposure is further confirmation of their inadequacy.
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Such problems have been known about for a long time. 
It is then hardly surprising that, to quote Andy Haldane:
“Surveys of investors suggest a fairly deep-seated 
scepticism about risk weights, with only a small frac-
tion regarding them as trustworthy … From a low 
base, investor faith in these risk weights has contin-
ued to fall fast.”26   
He presents the following chart comparing RWAs with 
the simpler metric of bank risk, bank leverage or the ra-
tio of bank assets to capital: 
Figures 3.1: Average Risk Weights and Leverage
26 See A. G. Haldane, “Constraining Discretion in Bank Regulation,” speech 
given at the Atlanta Fed conference, “Maintaining Financial Stability: Holding a 
Tiger by the Tail(s),” April 9, 2013), p. 11.
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The shapes of the two plots are virtually mirror images 
of each other. In the period from 1993 up to the crisis, 
average risk weights fell from 70% to 40%, whilst average 
leverage rose from about 20 to well over 30. The lever-
age ratio picked up the growing riskiness of the banking 
system, but the average RWA was a contrarian indicator 
of banking risk. He then observed:
“In the pre-crisis boom, bank leverage rose steadily 
to reach historically unprecedented levels. This sig-
nalled high and rising bank risk. Indeed, bank lever-
age and bank risk weights moved in opposite direc-
tions over this period … While the risk traffic lights 
were flashing bright red for leverage, for risk weights 
they were signalling ever-deeper green.
“The subsequent financial crisis has made clear 
which traffic light signal was at fault. The boom was 
leverage-fuelled and so too has been the subsequent 
bust.”27
The explanation is that the lower risk weights do not 
reflect reduced riskiness, but instead reflect the increas-
ing ability of bankers to game the risk-weighting system 
to hide the risks they were really taking. Thus, ironical-
ly, a lower risk weight usually translates into greater risk 
taking and we can reasonably conclude that the RWA 
measure is discredited. 
There is the point that estimates of required capital 
to RWA ratios based on a boom period cannot give us 
27 Haldane, op. cit., p. 10.
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sensible expected loss numbers in a crash. To quote Mr. 
Ferguson:
“When calculating the required capital to risk 
weights, banks estimate both the probability of de-
fault and the expected loss given default. Since they 
use recent (non-crisis) history to ‘calculate’ these 
probabilities, the higher the leverage that drives the 
credit boom pre-crisis, the lower both the estimated 
probability of default (which is a function of recent 
default figures) and the expected loss given default 
because the LTV falls. However, we all know that the 
best (only) way to create a crash is to inflate a boom 
first, making this risk weight methodology truly 
insane.”28
The RWA measure violates a basic principle of scien-
tific methodology – namely, that measures of the things 
we measure should actually measure the things that we 
think they measure. Instead, RWA is a pretend number 
that bears no useful relationship to the risks actually 
taken. Reliance on this pretend RWA number then has 
the effect of artificially boosting capital ratios that use 
RWA in the denominator, thereby creating the appear-
ance of capital that isn’t really there, i.e., fake capital. 
The inadequacy of the RWA measure (and that of the 
Tier 1 capital measure too) was also demonstrated in 
the GFC. As Sir Jon Cunliffe observed in 2014:
28 Personal correspondence
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“In early 2009, around the height of the financial 
crisis, the market valued the combined equity of the 
major UK banks at less than 2% of their total assets. 
… [Yet on] a risk weighted basis, the banks had 6.7% 
common equity capital – well above the 2% minimum. 
Tier 1 capital [to RWA] ratios were almost 9%.” 
That is, banks were well capitalised according to the 
standard regulatory RWA metrics. To continue:
“This was of course the time when fear was at its 
peak. The message was crystal clear. When it mat-
tered most, the market did not at all believe the pub-
lished numbers for bank capital adequacy...
“This episode tells us two things. The first is that fi-
nancial reporting matters. It matters at all times. But 
it matters most in times of stress...
“The second thing this episode shows us is that, 
when push came to shove, how little confidence 
investors had in the regulatory capital framework. 
In essence, markets discounted all types of capital 
except pure equity. And as they distrusted the risk-
weighted numbers, they wrote down the value of the 
equity to reach the numbers I mentioned earlier. 
“And, in many cases, they were right to do so. Capi-
tal adequacy turned out to be an illusion…
“When the crisis struck, not only did a significant 
portion of the assets turn out to be far riskier than 
estimated. Market confidence in the risk-weighted 
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capital adequacy framework as a whole pretty much 
evaporated.”29 (My italics)
Part of the explanation for the failure of the RWA meas-
ure is that banks were loading up on assets with low 
RWAs to reduce their capital requirements. Going fur-
ther, this RWA system is tailor-made for gaming: a bank 
loads up on low-weighted assets and is rewarded with a 
lower capital requirement because it is deemed to have 
low risk. In the limit, it could load up entirely on zero-
weighted assets: it would then be deemed to have zero 
risk and incur a zero capital requirement. 
The banks were gaming the system aggressively, too. 
Consider this quote from the FSA’s report into the fail-
ure of RBS:
“The capital regime was most deficient, moreover, 
in respect of the trading books of the banks, when 
required capital for many instruments was estimated 
using value-at-risk (VaR) approaches. The acquisi-
tion of ABN AMRO meant that RBS’s trading book 
assets almost doubled between end-2006 and end-
2007. The low risk weights assigned to trading assets 
suggested that only £2.3bn of core tier 1 capital was 
held to cover potential trading losses which might 
result from assets carried at around £470bn on the 
firm’s balance sheet.” 
29 J. Cunliffe “The role of the leverage ratio and the need to monitor risks 
outside the regulated banking sector,” speech to the Financial Reporting Council 
annual conference, London, Thursday 17 July 2014, p. 1. 
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£2.3 billion divided by £470 billion is less than 0.5%:
In fact, in 2008, losses of £12.2bn arose in the credit 
trading area alone (a subset of total trading book assets). 
Note too that the RBS’s credit risk models would have 
given this £12.2 billion loss a probability of about zero: 
such losses were effectively impossible according to the 
models. 
“A regime which inadequately evaluated trading 
book risks was, therefore, fundamental to RBS’s fail-
ure. This inadequacy was particularly significant for 
RBS, given that the purchase of ABN AMRO sig-
nificantly increased RBS’s trading book assets. RBS 
was allowed by the existing regulations massively to 
increase its trading risk exposure counterbalanced 
only by a small increase in capital buffers available to 
absorb loss.”30
When the higher Basel III capital standards were first 
announced in 2011, bankers’ first instincts were to com-
ply by gaming the system. To quote an article by Tom 
Braithwaite in the Financial Times:
“Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan’s chief executive, said 
last week that he intended to “manage the hell out 
of RWA” to reach the higher levels. Morgan Stanley 
revealed that its risk-weighted assets had ballooned 
by $44bn after the Fed said the bank was managing 
the hell out of its assets too much and told it to stop.
30 Quoted in Bailey, op. cit., p. 5.
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“A senior executive at a third bank told me that it 
was scouring its balance sheet, looking for assets that 
could be structured differently to achieve lower risk 
weights. …
“A senior regulator tells me officials are fully expect-
ing various nefarious schemes to circumvent the 
rules, including structured transactions that do not 
reduce their risk but do reduce their RWA.”31
Banks were (and still are) engaging in vast financial en-
gineering transactions to move assets from high to low 
weight classifications in order to reduce their capital re-
quirements. This game even has a name – Risk-Weight 
‘Optimisation’ (RWO) – and RWO really means risk-
weight minimisation. RWO was the main driving force 
behind the enormous growth in derivatives trading and 
securitization in the years running up to the GFC – and 
in so far as it led to (much) greater risk taking and (enor-
mous) capital depletion, RWO was also a major contrib-
uting factor to the GFC as well. 
A good example is the ‘how to destroy’ securitisation 
co-invented by Gordon Kerr in 2001. This little beauty 
used financial alchemy to game the Basel capital rules 
to transform a bog standard (big) bond portfolio held 
by a major UK financial institution into a (supposedly) 
almost risk-free credit derivative that warranted only 
one sixteenth of its previous capital requirement. Un-
fortunately, the risk reduction was only cosmetic and 
31 T. Braithwaite, “Banks turn to financial alchemy in search for capital,” 
Financial Times, October 24 2011. 
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the bond portfolio remained as risky as it had been be-
fore. The transaction reduced the bank’s required regu-
latory capital by fifteen sixteenths. This securitization 
was widely copied and Gordon was left wondering af-
terwards why it took so long for the banking system to 
fall over.32   
Thus, zero or low RWAs do not mean that the assets in-
volved are actually zero or low risk; instead, they mere-
ly mean that Basel allows them to assign zero or low 
risk status to the positions so designated, which is an 
altogether different matter. Examples include not just 
Greek government debt but also carry-trade positions, 
which have zero risk weights, and many credit deriva-
tives, securitizations and mortgaged-backed positions, 
which have very low risk weights. What these positions 
have in common is that they are all highly risky, but the 
Basel system operates to make those risks virtually in-
visible. 
It was widely acknowledged that RWAs were flawed. 
The solution, it was claimed, was to make the capital 
requirements more risk-sensitive – and the way to do 
that was to allow banks with approved risk-modelling 
capabilities to use their risk models to help determine 
their capital requirements. This principle was first 
enshrined in the Market Risk Amendment to Basel I 
(1996): this Amendment allowed banks to use their 
risk models to help determine their capital require-
ments for their market risks. The use of risk models to 
32 See G. Kerr, “How to destroy the British banking system – regulatory 
arbitrage via ‘pig on pork’ derivatives,” The Cobden Centre, January 21, 2010. 
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help determine capital requirements for credit and op-
erational risks was then the central feature of Basel II, 
which was rolled out to great fanfare in 2004. However, 
supplementing RWAs with risk models to determine 
capital requirements only made matters worse, as the 
risk models themselves are highly problematic:
• They are based on unreasonable assumptions 
(such as Gaussianity) and unreasonable risk meas-
ures (such as Value-at-Risk) that give enormous 
scope for creative traders and financial engineers to 
hide risks: traders can stuff risk into the VaR tails and 
so on.
• They are based on huge numbers of parameters, 
many of which cannot be estimated with any reason-
able precision, and involve a great deal of model risk 
and just plain guesswork, all of which gives plenty of 
further scope for creative game-playing to drive the 
risk numbers down.
• They use probability of default (PD) and loss 
given default (LGD) models that are by their nature 
pro-cyclical and in practice impossible to calibrate 
properly. 
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• There is an abundance of evidence from recent 
empirical studies to suggest that simpler models out-
perform more complex ones.33 
At a deeper level, Basel II created a model monoculture 
in which everyone was trying to do the same thing – to 
model risks the same way to play the system – but what 
none of the risk models could measure were the risks 
created by all the banks acting as a herd of lemmings, 
which is exactly how they then behaved. 
There is also a version of Goodhart’s Law operating by 
which risk models break down when used for control 
purposes, i.e., no model can take account of the ways 
in which it will be gamed. This interaction between the 
risk managers, the models they use to control risks and 
the responses of those being controlled by these models 
means that markets are not mathematizable. Risk mod-
elling is then just a game: the bankers pretend to model 
risks, but they are really gaming the risk numbers – and 
the regulators openly encourage them to do so. 
33 These include: A. Demirgüç-Kunt, E. Detragiache, and O. Merrouche, “Bank 
Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis,” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper Series No. 5473 2010); D. G. Mayes and H. Stremmel, “The Effectiveness 
of Capital Adequacy Measures in Predicting Bank Distress,” mimeo (2012); A. 
N. Berger and C. H. S. Bouwman, “How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance 
during Financial Crises?” Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013): 146–76; 
A. Blundell-Wignall and C. Roulet, “Business Models of Banks, Leverage and 
the Distance-to-Default,” OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 2012, no. 2 
(2014); T. L. Hogan, N. Meredith and X. Pan, “Evaluating Risk-Based Capital 
Regulation,” Mercatus Center Working Paper Series No. 13-02 (2013); and 
V. V. Acharya and S. Steffen, “Falling short of expectation - stress testing the 
Eurozone banking system,” CEPS Policy Brief No.215, January 2014.
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What then happened was that the banks hijacked the 
system and used it to ensure that their capital require-
ments became ever lower. The Basel system, which was 
meant to prop up banks’ levels of capital, had become 
the means by which the banks were decapitalised by the 
bankers themselves.  It was no coincidence that the fi-
nancial crisis hit soon afterwards and much of the inter-
national banking system collapsed. 
In short, the real (though seldom explicitly acknowl-
edged) purpose of risk modelling is to use capital regu-
lation to decapitalise the banks. The cybernetic POSI-
WID principle applies: the purpose of a system is what 
it does, not what some regulator says it does. When the 
banks later go bust, the bankers play dumb and lobby 
for a bailout; the banks then get recapitalised at pub-
lic expense and the game repeats itself until the public 
eventually refuse to put up with it any more. 
It is therefore no wonder that the models don’t work: 
they were not intended to. 
One could give many examples of the inadequate per-
formance of risk models but three in particular are posi-
tively stunning:
• Calculations performed by the Bank of England 
showed that for the four biggest UK banks, cumula-
tive trading losses over the height of the crisis were 
up to six times the value of the model-determined 
capital set aside to cover against such losses.34 
34 A. G. Haldane, “Capital Discipline,” speech given to the American Economic 
Association, Denver, Colorado, January 9, 2011, chart 3.
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• UK banks’ reported losses – and these were pri-
marily banking book losses – over 2007-2010 were 
over 183% of the banks’ combined capital and re-
serves.35 
• In August 2007 Goldman’s CFO David Viniar 
famously explained that their flagship GEO hedge 
fund was being bit by 25-standard deviation (or 25 
sigma) moves, several days in a row. It was then be-
ing said that Goldman must have been unlucky, as a 
single 25 sigma event was a once in a 100, 000 year 
event. Unlucky is not the word, however. I sat down 
and did the calculations myself: the expected wait-
ing time to observe a single 25 sigma daily event 
under the Gaussian distribution, the one normally 
used in finance, is 1.309 e+135 years, i.e., about 1.3 
with the decimal point moved 135 spaces to the left, 
a number that so vast that it dwarves cosmological 
numbers.36  Therefore the Gaussian distribution, 
the most popular distribution used in risk manage-
ment, is useless in the face of the big risks that mat-
ter. Risk managers should be banned from using it.
In each case, the risk models and resulting capital charg-
es were signed off as compliant by regulators, but subse-
quent losses greatly exceeded the risk capital set aside 
to cover against them: the banks appeared to be capital 
adequate, but the model-based risk-weighted metrics 
merely disguised how weak the banks really were.
35 LAPFF, 2011, p. 3.
36 To put this number into perspective, the number of particles in the universe is 
believed to be no more than 10e+84. See K. Dowd, J. Cotter, C. Humphrey and 
M. Woods, “How unlucky is 25-sigma?” Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 
34, No. 4, (Summer 2008), pp. 76-80.
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This RWA issue means that banks shouldn’t be as-
sessed by the ratio of core capital (however measured) 
to RWA. They should be assessed against a capital ratio 
that uses a much broader exposure measure that does 
not presume to predict or assign risk weights among 
asset classes, is more difficult to game and provides a 
more clear picture of a bank’s ability to absorb loss re-
gardless of source.
As a final PS on the RWA issue: whilst even regulators 
are now willing to concede that regulators were com-
plicit in RWA games in the period up to the GFC, the 
fact is that they are still playing them themselves – or at 
least they were until November 2016. The reader will 
recall from Chapter 1 how the Bank’s November 2016 
Financial Stability Report tried to pass off the increase 
in the banks’ CET1 ratio from 6.92 percent in 2009 to 
12.61 percent in 2015 as capital rebuilding whilst si-
multaneously noting that almost three-quarters of this 
‘rebuilding’ actually boosted the capital ratio by reduc-
ing the risk weighted assets in the denominator. An in-
nocent reader could easily have formed the impression 
that the increase in the capital ratio from 6.92 percent 
to 12.61 percent reflected a substantial increase in actual 
capital. 
Total assets
Traditionally, the total exposure was taken to be the to-
tal assets of the bank.  This exposure measure worked 
fairly well when off-balance sheet items were fairly 
small and/or safe, and the accounting standards were 
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fairly reliable. In these circumstances TA is a good 
proxy for the most that the bank can lose. However, for 
many years now the on-balance-sheet amounts at risk 
have been overshadowed by the amounts at risk off the 
balance sheet in derivatives (such as Credit Default 
Swaps) and certain securitizations. These off-balance-
sheet risks have long since made total assets highly in-
adequate as a measure of exposure, even leaving aside 
the fact that the TA is itself gameable. 
Consider Barclays as an example – and I choose Bar-
clays because none of the other banks’ names begin 
with the letter ‘A’. 
Reported data for end-2016 from its 2016 Annual Re-
port, indicates that the fair value of Barclays’ total OTC 
(over the counter) derivatives liabilities for trading pur-
poses was 25% of its reported total assets. However, 
these fair value numbers are based on a bunch of as-
sumptions about hedge accounting and netting – many 
of which would unravel in a crisis. Any reasonable esti-
mate of Barclays ‘true’ OTC derivatives exposure would 
then be higher than that. At the other extreme, the no-
tional value of its OTC derivatives positions weighs in 
at 1,042% of total assets. This latter figure however will 
be a major over-estimate of the bank’s OTC derivatives 
exposure as many notional amounts are close to mean-
ingless as indicators of true exposure. So all we (think 
we) know is that the ‘true’ OTC exposure is somewhere 
between 25% and 1,042% of total assets, and there are 
the other off-balance-sheet exposures to consider as 
well. It is therefore safe to conclude that Barclays’ true 
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exposures would be considerably greater than its total 
assets figure might lead us to believe.
The Leverage Exposure Measure
To help mitigate the problems associated with these 
earlier measures, the Basel III bank capital regulatory 
regime introduced a new measure of the amount at risk 
known as the ‘leverage exposure’. This measure makes 
an attempt to incorporate some of the off-balance-sheet 
risks that do not appear in the total assets measure, 
whilst avoiding the problems associated with RWAs. 
 One problem is that large derivatives positions can re-
main excluded from the leverage exposure because of 
rules that allow them to be excluded if they are offset by 
other positions, the theory being that the net position is 
hedged. Unfortunately, some hedges are very poor and 
none is perfect: as we say in risk management, the only 
perfect hedge is in a Japanese garden. Hedges are im-
perfect for several reasons:
First, few if any hedge instruments are exact matches 
to the underlying position being hedged, which com-
pensate exactly for losses on that position. Any ex ante 
asssessment of the performance of a hedge instrument 
in an adverse scenario is dependent on a lot of assump-
tions, especially in very adverse scenarios (i.e., the ones 
that matter). There is always some slippage – known as 
basis risk – and some hedges involve a lot of basis risk. 
So even when a hedge might look good on paper, we of-
ten have little idea how well it would perform in a crisis. 
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To give an example, over the period 2005 to 2009, it 
transpired that Deutsche Bank had a large – at one 
point, a $130 billion large – position in leveraged super 
senior trades, ‘super senior’ or quadruple A meaning 
theoretically safer than AAA bonds. The main risks in 
these positions were credit risks, but it transpired that 
the bank was hedging them with S&P put options, i.e., it 
was hedging credit risks with market risks. Such a hedg-
ing strategy involves an amateurish mistake on a grand 
scale: market and credit risks are quite different, and 
there was a very real danger that both the original posi-
tion and its supposed hedges could take massive hits at 
the same time. Indeed, this seems to have been what 
happened. This gross-becomes-net outcome proved 
fatal for Lehman and may well have proven fatal for 
Deutsche too – had the bank allegedly not hidden the 
problem until (some of ) the truth emerged in 2012.37 
Second, most hedges involve contracts with counter-
parties and therefore create an exposure to counterpar-
ty credit risk. As we saw with AIG, if a key counterparty 
fails, the netting breaks down and the gross position can 
become net with miserable consequences for the party 
relying on the hedge. Such problems could then create 
cascade effects. Suppose Bank A has some credit expo-
sure to Bank B and institutes what appears to be a good 
hedging strategy to manage that exposure. Bank B, in 
turn, is exposed to Bank C, and institutes what appears 
to be a good hedging strategy to manage that exposure. 
Bank C then goes belly-up and Bank B experiences a 
37 T. Braithwaite, M. Mackenzie and K. Scammell, “Deutsche Bank: Show of 
strength or a fiction?” Financial Times, December 12, 2012. 
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gross-becomes-net disaster that is transmitted to Bank 
A, which was unaware of its indirect exposure to Bank 
C. Concerns about counterparty cascade effects were a 
key feature in the AIG fiasco. 
Returning to the leverage exposure, we have all these 
problems plus the usual gap between theory and prac-
tice resulting from regulatory capture by the industry. 
In theory, the leverage exposure is meant to take ac-
count of off-balance sheet items that would not show 
up in traditional exposure measures such as total assets. 
However, the regulatory leverage exposure measure is 
a highly compromised measure that is the product of a 
lot of behind the scenes lobbying by banks keen to keep 
their measured exposures down in order to minimise 
their capital requirements. Given (a) that off-balance-
sheet items can be large relative to on-balance-sheet 
ones and (b) that accounting netting rules tend to hide 
a great deal of financial risk, then we would expect any 
reasonable exposure measure to be considerably larger 
than reported total assets.  
But they are not, at least not for UK banks. When I 
looked into this matter, I was astonished to discover 
that the leverage exposures of UK banks are not only 
of the same magnitude as their total assets, but are usu-
ally even lower. As of 2016q3, LE was lower than TA 
for four of the big five banks, and on average, LE was 
just under 94 percent of TA. Consequently, the lever-
age exposure measure that takes account of (some) off-
balance sheet items is usually less than the total assets 
measure that does not take account of any of them. If 
you don’t understand that, then your brain is working. 
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What seems to have happened is that the problems 
posed by hidden off-balance-sheet risks and inadequate 
RWA measures led to regulatory pressure to find a new 
denominator measure that could be used as a basis for 
additional capital requirements. This response started 
as a worthy effort to patch up some of the more glaring 
loopholes in the Basel system. However, the banking in-
dustry soon piled in to lobby against a broader denomi-
nator that would have increased their capital require-
ments – which was, of course, one of the objectives of 
the regulators in the first place. 
Naturally, the banking lobby did not openly oppose the 
leverage exposure measure on the grounds that it would 
have led to higher capital requirements – that would 
have been too obvious. Instead, the banks emphasised 
level playing field issues – which are fundamentally ir-
relevant, but that is another story – relating primarily 
to the differences between US Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles (GAAP) accounting standards and 
the IFRS accounting standards that apply in many coun-
tries outside the United States.38 The key point here is 
that the latter produce notably higher asset values and 
lower capital ratios than the former, other things being 
equal. 
This US GAAP vs. IFRS issue provided a useful smoke-
screen to divert the reform discussion towards harmo-
nisation for the purposes of agreeing how to measure 
the denominator in the new regulatory leverage ratio. 
The banks had hijacked the reform effort and the result 
38 For more, see, e.g., A. Admati and M. Hellwig, op. cit., pp. 194-199. 
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was peddled as a solution to the off-balance-sheet prob-
lem when the reality was that it was not. 
So why is the leverage exposure of similar or less mag-
nitude to total assets under IFRS? The answer is that 
US GAAP allows much more generous netting arrange-
ments than IFRS, so from an IFRS perspective, lever-
age exposure equals IFRS total assets + plus OBS add-
ons + less generous netting, and these latter two offset 
each other. From the US GAAP perspective, leverage 
exposure equals US GAAP total assets + plus OBS add-
ons + more generous netting, and so leverage exposure 
is somewhat, perhaps about 40 percent, higher than US 
GAAP total assets, and may or (probably) may not be a 
good measure of true exposure. 
Well, you might say, at least the leverage exposure gets 
us away from the evil of RWAs. It does not even do that, 
however. Instead, it reintroduces them through the 
backdoor under a different name. The relevant Basel 
Committee document handles derivatives exposures by 
means of a system of ‘Credit Conversion Factors’, add-
on factors that are arbitrary, low and frankly senseless.39 
For example, for standard interest-rate, FX, equities 
and commodity derivatives there are a series of add-on 
factors that vary from 0% to 15%, and for more exotic 
Total Return Swaps and Credit Default Swaps there 
are add-ons of 5% or 10%.  The resulting numbers for 
OBS positions are low and bear no relationship to the 
true risk exposures. And so these add-ons reintroduce 
39 See Basel Committee, “Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure 
requirements,” January 2014, pp. 18-19. 
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the equivalent of new risk weights and take us back to 
the RWA problems that the broader exposure measures 
were supposed to escape from!
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4. Stress-testing 
methodology 
INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of central bank stress testing 
is (supposedly) to assess the banking system’s capi-
tal adequacy, i.e., to assess the ability of banks to with-
stand financial stress.40, 41 A stress test has three key 
components:
40 Since No Stress III is focused on the 2016 stress tests, this chapter gives a 
bare-essentials guide to understanding stress testing methodology. However, 
there is much more to be said on the deeper methodological weaknesses of 
regulatory stress tests. For more on these, see No Stress II, Chapter 3 or Chapter 
7 below. 
41 I emphasise that I am concerned in this study only with stress tests for bank 
solvency: stress tests for bank liquidity adequacy are another subject on which 
there is much to be said. An introduction to those stress tests is L. L. Ong and M. 
Cihák, “Of Runes and Sagas: Perspectives on Liquidity Stress Testing Using an 
Iceland Example,” IMF Working Paper 10/156, July 2010.
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1. An assumed adverse stress scenario – essen-
tially a guess scenario generated by modellers at the 
central bank.
2. A metric to gauge the strength of each bank. 
This metric is the bank’s capital ratio – the ratio of 
‘core’ capital to some measure of the total amount 
‘at risk’ - the intuition being that core capital pro-
vides a buffer to absorb potential losses and keep 
the bank solvent in a stress.
3. A pass standard by which to determine whether 
the post-stress value of the capital ratio is (or is not) 
high enough to merit a pass mark in the test. 
There is a natural analogy with a school exam, the pur-
pose of which is to assess a student’s academic strength. 
It too has three key components:
1. There is an exam paper based on a set of ques-
tions and the underlying issue of how easy or tough 
the exam paper might be. The easiness/toughness 
of an exam paper is comparable to the severity or 
otherwise of the stress scenario.
2. There is the performance of the candidate in the 
exam, i.e., the grade they receive.
3. There is the pass standard, i.e., the minimum 
mark that a student must achieve in order to pass 
the exam.
One then draws one’s conclusions. For example, if one 
had an easy set of questions, a low pass standard and a 
student who achieved a low mark, then one would con-
clude that the student was academically weak. 
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Similarly, if one had a stress test with a mild stress sce-
nario, a low pass standard and generally low post-stress 
capital ratios then the test would prove that the banking 
system was financially weak.
Central bank stress tests also have a second objec-
tive – to promote public confidence in the banking sys-
tem and, implicitly, to promote confidence in the cen-
tral bank’s policies towards the banking system. Indeed, 
this objective is stressed so frequently by central banks 
that one often gets the impression that the promotion of 
confidence is actually the primary objective. 
But the question is whether that confidence is justified 
or not. 
The problem is that these two objectives are often in 
conflict. If the banking system is weak then a bona fide 
stress test with a severe scenario and a rigorous pass 
standard should reveal that weakness. Unfortunately, 
revealing that weakness would undermine confidence 
in the banking system and undermine the second objec-
tive. In such circumstances, the only way to achieve 
the confidence-boosting objective is to water down 
the stress test exercise to engineer an undeserved pass 
result. 
If the stress tests give the banking system a clean bill 
of health, the clash between these two objectives gives 
the central bank a credibility problem: it needs to per-
suade potential critics that the test really was demand-
ing, and it needs to reassure them that it is not putting 
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its confidence-boosting objective ahead of the integrity 
of the test itself. 
This credibility problem is the central issue with the 
stress tests. 
This problem is heightened further by the fact that the 
central bank has a vested interest in the confidence-
boosting objective: apart from anything else, for the 
central bank to suggest that the banking system was in 
poor shape would be to acknowledge that its own poli-
cies had failed. 
However, it is sometimes still possible for an outside 
observer to make an informed judgment on the integrity 
of any stress test: the key is to look for evidence that the 
test is demanding. So if there is strong evidence that the 
adverse scenarios are genuinely severe and if there are 
a reasonable number of them, if the pass standards are 
high, if there are no obvious major biases or weaknesses, 
and so forth, one might incline to believe the results.
Conversely, one might not. A sure sign of a cheat is a 
stress test that emphasises harsh macro assumptions 
but does nothing to ensure that these harsh assump-
tions make it through to the micro level projected loss 
rates. The stress testers at the EBA and ECB are very 
good at this. 
We now consider some of the key methodological issues 
in stress testing.
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THE STRESS SCENARIOS 
Let’s start with the selection of stress scenarios. A 
stress scenario is a hypothetical adverse event – essen-
tially, it is a model-based guess of what might happen in 
the future. 
The first question that then arises is how severely 
adverse should a stress-scenario be? There are no hard 
and fast rules here, but one needs a scenario that is 
seriously severe but not off-the-chart severe. If a sce-
nario is too mild, then the usual stress test result – that 
the banks pass the stress test – is of no use beyond an 
attempt at propaganda. A stress test based on a mild 
scenario is like an exam with a very easy set of ques-
tions: it tells us nothing useful because even a poor 
candidate will pass. At the other extreme, an impossi-
bly severe scenario is of no use either. The correspond-
ing exam analogy also applies: an exam with an impos-
sibly demanding set of questions tells us nothing useful 
because even the best candidate will fail. 
Then there is the question of the type of scenario to use 
in a stress test. Again, there are no hard and fast rules, 
but one is looking for plausible ‘what if’ adverse events. 
These could be based on suspected vulnerabilities: if 
one suspects that a bank is heavily exposed to, say, real 
estate, then one might use stress tests that attempt to 
gauge the bank’s ability to withstand a severe real-estate 
downturn. One can also select scenarios based on hypo-
thetical repeats of historical experiences or contempo-
rary experiences overseas. Most obviously, one might 
compare the severity of a scenario with the 1930s, the 
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East Asia crisis, the GFC or the recent experience of 
the Eurozone. Some obvious contemporary risk scenar-
ios that might form the basis of stress test scenarios are 
the possibilities of a renewed Eurozone banking crisis, 
a major banking crisis in China or a decent rerun of the 
GFC. 
There is also the question of how many scenarios to 
run. Since the future is uncertain, one wants a range of 
substantially different scenarios that one hopes might 
approximate the main risks that banks face as best one 
can perceive them. However, there is no magic formula 
to tell us how many scenarios to consider, i.e., one has to 
make a judgment about how many to use.  
There is however one hard and fast rule: both the risk 
management literature and even common sense sug-
gest that at the very least one should not rely on a sin-
gle adverse scenario.42 The chances of any particular 
scenario coming to pass are very small, and it is highly 
likely that one will get an outcome quite different to that 
envisaged. 
So even if one conducts an otherwise flawless stress 
test that shows that the banking system is safe under the 
scenario considered, one cannot possibly know whether 
the banking system will be safe under all the other plau-
sible scenarios that were not considered. This is so 
because: 
42 For more on the state of the art in financial stress testing, see, e.g., “Stress 
testing”, pp. 291-307 in K. Dowd, Measuring Market Risk, 2nd edition, 
Chichester: Wiley, 2005 or D. Rösch and H. Scheule (eds) Stress Testing for 
Financial Institutions, London: RiskBooks, 2008.
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• The impact of any scenario on a bank depends 
on the extent to which the scenario captures that 
bank’s particular vulnerabilities – banks have dif-
ferent business models and different sectoral and 
geographical footprints. 
• If one relies on just one scenario one could easily 
have a situation where a weak bank performs well 
in a stress test only because the scenario misses its 
main risk exposures. It is precisely to reduce this 
danger that the stress testing literature advises 
that, if one is to do stress testing at all, one should 
rely on multiple and substantially different scenar-
ios in the hope that if a bank has a major vulnera-
bility, then at least one of the scenario analyses will 
flag it.
No single scenario can ever give you confidence that the 
banking system is safe.  A recent article put this point 
much better than I could: 
“A key principle underlying the Bank’s approach 
to stress testing is to explore a range of scenarios. 
Any single scenario is almost certain not to materi-
alise. And it is not desirable from a regulatory per-
spective that the banking system as a whole is only 
assessed against a single ‘bad state of the world’. 
Moreover, from a practical perspective, differences 
in banks’ business models imply that scenarios that 
might be stressful for one bank might be much less 
so for another. To make the framework useful for 
policymakers, stress tests should explore different 
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vulnerabilities and manifestations of possible future 
stresses.”
And where does this admirable advice come from? It 
comes from the Bank of England’s own ‘framework’ 
paper on the stress tests! 43
Image your doctor is giving you a health check-up: they 
wouldn’t run a test for bowel cancer, say, and then use a 
negative result to conclude that you were free of heart 
disease, let alone of anything else that you might have 
as well. If your doctor did that, they would be struck off. 
No one medical test can reassure you that you are in 
perfect health, and yet this is what the Bank of Englad 
is trying to do with its stress tests: it is trying to use one 
test (and an unconvincing one at that!) to demonstrate 
that the banking system is in robust good health. It just 
can’t be done. 
To repeat: we cannot draw general inferences about the 
robustness of the banking system to a range of possible 
future shocks from any exercise based on a single hypo-
thetical scenario. 
In stress testing, what is important is to model a range 
of different scenarios in a simple broad-brush manner, 
not to fine-tune any one scenario whilst ignoring other 
scenarios entirely. To quote risk expert Christopher 
Finger:
43 See Bank of England, “A framework for stress testing the UK banking 
system,” October 2013, p. 19.
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 “...we do not look at any single scenario carefully, but 
rather hope that the set of scenarios covers the spec-
trum of risks we might face.”44
One might even say that this is the first fundamental 
principle of good stress testing.
The stress scenarios are way too orderly in that they 
do not capture key features of real-world financial cri-
ses. They understate the fat tails and nonlinearities, 
they do not capture the adverse feedback and amplifica-
tion effects, or the chaos, confusion, funding and fire-
sale problems. As well as underestimating the impact 
of real sector effects on the financial sector, they also 
underestimate the impact of financial sector effects on 
the real sector, and above all, they underestimate the 
opaque interconnectedness of the system. To quote 
Anat Admati: 
“It is impossible to predict with any precision how 
an actual crisis, which may come from an unex-
pected direction, would play out in the highly inter-
connected system. The opacity of the system and the 
existence of many layers of intermediation make it 
difficult to assess true counterparty risk and the cor-
relation between underlying macro risk and counter-
party risk. Risks that are assumed to be transferred 
44  C. C. Finger, “Epilogue – Fishing for complements”, p. 444 in D. Rösch and 
H. Scheule (eds) Stress Testing for Financial Institutions, London: RiskBooks, 
2008.
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and dispersed may instead be concentrated else-
where, as happened in the case of AIG.”45 
These factors make financial crises much more costly 
than normal recessions and the stress tests greatly 
understate them.46 Morris Goldstein provides a neat 
example:
“(a) Note that when former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke testified to Congress in 
2007 about the subprime crisis, he estimated that 
it would generate total losses in the neighborhood 
of $50 billion to $100 billion … (b) But … when 
Bernanke gave testimony in an AIG court case … he 
explained that, by September and October of 2008, 
12 of 13 of the most important financial institutions 
in the United States were at risk of failure within a 
period of a week or two. The question for stress test 
architects and modelmakers is, How do you make 
your models generate a transition from (a) to (b) in 
the course of, say, a year or two? This is not a tech-
nical sideshow. In stress modeling, it is the main 
event.”47
45  A. R. Admati, “The missed opportunity and challenge of capital regulation,” 
National Institute Economic Review Number 235, February 2016, pp. R4-R14.
46  M. Goldstein, Banking’s Final Exam: Stress testing and bank-capital reform: 
Washington DC: Petersen Institute for International Economics, May 2017.
47  Op. cit., p. 251. 
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THE PASS STANDARD
Turning now to the pass standard, the first point to 
appreciate is that the Bank does not regard its hur-
dle rate or its new Systemic Reference Points (SRP) as 
pass standards in a strict sense. The Bank always makes 
a point of saying that the result of the test is not some 
automated pass/fail exercise based purely on how the 
post-stress leverage ratio compares to the hurdle rate 
or SRP: the Financial Policy Committee gives due con-
sideration to other factors. However, in practice so far, 
the FPC has always operated ‘as if’ the exercise were an 
automatic pass/fail one based purely on how that lever-
age ratio compares to the hurdle rate, and so for present 
purposes we may treat the exercise ‘as if’ it were this 
way and skip the subjective judgement step. In any case, 
I am not able to second guess those judgements as I am 
not privy to whatever other information they used or 
how they interpreted it.
The 2016 stress test involves two sets of pass stand-
ards, if I may use that term here. The first is the hur-
dle rate, and the second is the Systemic Reference Point 
which applies to banks deemed to be systemically risky. 
The SRP in turn is equal to the hurdle rate and phase-in 
value of such a bank’s G-SIB (or Globally Systemically 
Important Bank) buffer which will generally rise over 
time until the G-SIB buffer is fully phased-in. 
There are then the hurdle rate and SRPs for the CET1/
RWA capital ratio and those for the Tier 1 leverage ratio 
which are suitably scaled down. 
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The pass standards for the CET1 ratio
The average hurdle rate for the CET1 ratio is 6.5 per-
cent, and the corresponding average SRPs rise from 
6.9% percent in 2016 to 7.8 percent in 2020. My first 
observation here is that these new pass standards are 
a considerable improvement over the 2015 stress test 
which had a single low hurdle rate of 4.5 percent. 
However, the impact of these changes, welcome as they 
are, is mitigated by the consideration emphasised in the 
previous chapter that the CET/RWA metric is highly 
flawed due to its reliance on the useless if not worse 
than useless RWA measure. 
The pass standards for the Tier 1 leverage ratio
The hurdle rate for the Tier 1 leverage ratio is still 3 
percent, as it was in the 2015 test. However, the aver-
age leverage ratio SRP rises from 3.1 percent in 2016 to 
3.4 percent in 2020, and is 3.3 percent at the peak of the 
stress in 2017. 
We can assess these pass standards both against better 
regulatory practice overseas and against first principles.
The pass standards for the Tier 1 leverage ratio 
viewed against better regulatory practice overseas
The 3 percent Tier 1 minimum capital requirement 
original comes from Basel III imported into the UK. 
However, even with the G-SIB add-ons, this standard is 
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still low compared against better practice overseas, i.e., 
in the United States:
• The Federal Reserve has been enforcing a min-
imum required Tier 1 to (un-risk-weighted) assets 
leverage ratio of 4% on all U.S. banks since 2014, 
and this 4% requirement is one of the pass stand-
ards used in its Comprehensive Capital Analysis 
and Review (CCAR) stress tests.48
• Banks there have to meet a 5% minimum lever-
age ratio to be regarded as ‘well-capitalised’ under 
the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework 
– and a bank with a leverage ratio of 2% or less is 
regarded as so badly capitalised that it should be 
put into receivership. 
• The Federal Reserve is in the process of impos-
ing a 5% minimum leverage ratio requirement on 
the 8 US G-SIB bank holding companies and a 6% 
minimum leverage ratio on their federally insured 
subsidiaries effective on 1 January 2018.49
48 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Comprehensive 
Capital Analysis and Review 2014: Assessment Framework and Results,” pp. 
8-9. 
49  See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,” Agencies Adopt 
Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Final Rule and Issue Supplementary 
Leverage Ratio Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.” Press release, April 8 2014. 
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The leverage ratio pass standard viewed against 
first principles
Let’s step back for moment. It is generally acknowl-
edged that high bank leverage was a key factor con-
tributing to severity of the GFC. For the UK, Bank of 
England data suggest that UK banks’ average simple 
leverage was 27.8 in 2007.
Basel III then sought to counter high leverage by impos-
ing a minimum required leverage ratio on regulated 
banks.50 
So how onerous are Basel III’s constraints on bank lev-
erage? More precisely, what is the maximum permitted 
leverage under Basel III? 
A clear expression of the Basel rules on this point is 
the following from the 2015 Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (PRA) Rulebook in the UK:
3 MINIMUM LEVERAGE RATIO 
3.1 A firm must hold sufficient tier 1 capital to 
maintain, at all times, a minimum leverage ratio of 
3%. 
50  Critics however have argued that such requirements are onerous. These 
include many leading bankers (e.g., Jamie Dimon and former Deutsche Bank 
chairman Josef Ackermann) and even central bankers (e.g., Alan Greenspan), the 
American Bankers Association, and the British Bankers Association (see, e.g., the 
citations in A. Admati, A. and M. Hellwig, 2013).
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3.2 For the purposes of complying with 3.1, at least 
75% of the firm’s tier 1 capital must consist of com-
mon equity tier 1 capital.51
 As an aside, it is disappointing to see that the PRA’s 
own rulebook explicitly endorses the ‘capital is a rainy 
day fund’ fallacy by stating that banks “hold” capital. 
This is the same mistake that Governor Carney made 
in the November 30 2016 press conference when he 
referred to banks “hoarding” capital. To repeat: banks 
do not “hold” or “hoard” capital. To suggest that they 
do so is to suggest that capital is an asset to a bank. It is 
not. Read Admati and Hellwig. 
This minimum required leverage ratio is expressed in 
terms of the ratio of Tier 1 capital to the leverage expo-
sure. Section 3.1 of the PRA Rulebook would suggest 
that the maximum permitted leverage is then 1/3 per-
cent = 33.33. 
Section 3.2 of the PRA Rulebook then states that at least 
75 percent of the firm’s Tier 1 capital should consist of 
CET1 capital.
Now 25 percent of the 3 percent minimum Tier 1 lever-
age ratio is 0.75 percent, so the leverage ratio expressed 
in terms of CET1 capital = 3 percent minus 0.75 percent 
= 2.25 percent. 
This implies CET1 leverage = 1/0.0225 = 44.44.
51  Prudential Regulation Authority (2015) PRA Rulebook: CRR Firms: 
Leverage Ratio Instrument 2015. London: PRA, p. 15. 
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However, Basel III also allows banks to include a ‘sin 
bucket’ of non-CET1 capital items as part of their 
reported CET1.
So let’s distinguish between ‘reported’ CET1 (or CET1 
including the sin bucket) and ‘clean’ CET1 (or CET1 
purged of the sin bucket). 
Under Basel III rules, the clean CET1 can be as low as 
85 percent of reported CET1.52
Let’s also assume that bankers make maximum use of 
the sin bucket so the clean CET1 = 85 percent ×reported 
CET1. 
This means that the Leverage Ratio using clean CET1 
can be as low as 85 percent × 2.25 percent = 1.9125 
percent and still comply with the Basel III minimum 
required leverage ratio. Inverting this number gives the 
maximum permitted leverage using clean CET1, i.e., 
1/1.9125 percent = 52.29.53 
A loss of 2 percent of the leverage exposure would then 
be more than enough to wipe out a bank’s CET1 capital. 
52  For more on the ‘sin bucket’ see T. F. Huertas (2014) Safe to Fail: How 
Resolution will Revolutionise Banking. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 23, 
or Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (June 2011) “Basel III: A global 
regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems,” pp. 21-6 
and 65.  
53  If one took account of the G-SIB buffer, the maximum permitted leverage 
would be somewhat lower. For example, at the peak of the stress, the maximum 
permitted leverage would be 52.28 × 3 ÷ 3.3 = 47.53 and this is still very high.
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In plain English, the Basel III capital rules allow banks to 
maintain remarkably high leverage and still be Basel III-
compliant. Indeed, the Basel capital rules would appear 
to allow banks to maintain considerably higher leverage 
than they had on the eve of the financial crisis! 
I should also note some qualifications, which will serve 
to further loosen the impact of the Basel III maximum 
leverage constraint: 
The first is that these calculations ignore sources of hid-
den leverage such as accounting standards that cause 
capital to be over-reported, or the additional leverage in 
off-balance sheet positions. 
The second is that the above calculations relate to book 
values, not to market values, and market-value leverage 
will typically be higher than book-value leverage. 
In fact, since Basel III does not impose any restriction 
on market-value leverage, the maximum permitted 
market-value leverage under Basel III is theoretically 
unbounded.
Then there is the question of what the ‘ideal’ minimum 
required leverage ratio should be. FDIC Vice Chairman 
Thomas M. Hoenig has called for a minimum required 
ratio of 10 percent tangible equit to assets.54 In his 
book, The End of Alchemy, former Bank of England 
54  T. M. Hoenig, “A market-based proposal for regulatory relief and 
accountability.” Remarks to the Institute of International Bankers Annual 
Washington Conference, March 13 2017.
108 NO STRESS III
108
Governor Mervyn King wrote that “[a] minimum ratio 
of equity to total assets of 10 per cent would be a good 
start.”55 Others would go further. Many experts are 
of the view that this minimum should be close to an 
order of magnitude greater than current minimum capi-
tal requirements anywhere in the world, or even higher. 
There is no magic number but one wants a minimum 
requirement that is high enough to remove the over-
whelming part of the risk-taking moral hazard that cur-
rently infects our banking system. 
A famous example is an important letter drafted by 
Anat Admati in the Financial Times in 2010, in which 
no less than 20 renowned experts recommended a min-
imum ratio of equity to total assets of at least 15 per-
cent, and some of these wanted minimum require-
ments that are much higher still.56 Independently, John 
Allison, Martin Hutchinson and yours truly have called 
for minimum capital to asset ratios of at least 15 per-
cent.57 Allan Meltzer, Neel Kaskari, and Walker Todd 
recommended a minimum of 20 percent for the largest 
55  M. King, The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking and the Future of the Global 
Economy, London: Little, Brown, 2016, p. 280.
56 A. Admati, F. Allen, R. Brealey, M. Brennan, A. Boot, M. Brunnermeier, 
J. Cochrane, P. DeMarzo, E. Fama, M. Fishman, C. Goodhart, M. Hellwig, H. 
Leland, S. Myers, P. Pfleiderer, J.-C. Rochet, S. Ross, W. Sharpe, C. Spatt and 
A. Thakor, “Health banking system is the goal, not profitable banks.” Financial 
Times, November 9, 2010.
57 J. A. Allison, 2014, The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure: How 
Destructive Banking Reform is Killing the Economy, New York: McGraw Hill, p. 
351. 
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banks.58, 59 Admati and Hellwig recommended a min-
imum “at least of the order of 20-30 percent”.60 Fama 
and Simon Johnson recommended a minimum of the 
order of 40-50 percent.61, 62 
Finally, on the subject of what the optimal leverage ratio 
might be, I would strongly endorse Morris Goldstein’s 
careful analysis of this issue, set out in Chapter 4 of his 
newly published book Banking’s Final Exam: Stress 
testing and bank-capital reform: he suggests that the 
optimal leverage ratio – and by implication, the optimal 
minimum required regulatory leverage ratio – should be 
in the region of 15 percent overall, somewhat less for the 
smaller and non-systemic banks and somewhat more for 
the systemic ones. 63
THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE: PRUDENCE
A key guiding principle that should govern the Bank’s 
choices in stress testing (and, indeed, everything else it 
does) is the Principle of Prudence: when faced with any 
set of choices, the default should be to go with the most 
58 N.Kaskari, “Make big banks put 20% down – just like homebuyers do.” Wall 
Street Journal, February 14th 2017
59 Meltzer is cited in Admati and Hellwig, 2013, p. 311. Todd’s own came from 
personal correspondence on May 21st 2017 when he said “Start with 20 percent 
on a leverage basis, not risk adjusted, for the big boys, ad then we’ll talk.”
60 Op cit., p. 179.
61 Op cit., p. 308.
62 Op. cit., p. 311. 
63 M. Goldstein, Banking’s Final Exam: Stress testing and bank-capital reform: 
Washington DC: Petersen Institute for International Economics, May 2017.  
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prudent choice.  Indeed, the Principle of Prudence is a 
bedrock principle of good central banking. 
This issue comes up repeatedly in the stress tests. Let’s 
consider some examples:
Example 1
The central bank faces a choice over how many stress 
scenarios to run. 
Experts in risk management and stress testing advise 
strongly against relying on only one scenario. 
The Principle of Prudence would suggest that the cen-
tral bank should run a number of adverse scenarios. 
So what does the central bank do? 
It runs just one adverse scenario. 
Example 2
The central bank faces a number of decisions relat-
ing to the severity (or otherwise) of its pass standards. 
For example, for the leverage ratio test, should it apply 
the bare minimum regulatory standard, the 3% Basel III 
standard applied to Tier 1 capital, or should it apply a 
higher standard? 
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The Principle of Prudence would suggest that it should 
opt for a higher pass standard. 
So what does the central bank do? 
It chooses the lower pass standard. 
In fact, for the leverage ratio test, it applies a pass stand-
ard that allows for considerably greater leverage than 
the banks had on the eve of the GFC. 
Example 3
The central bank is wondering whether to use the RWA 
measure in its capital regulations and stress tests. This 
measure is however highly controversial and has been 
widely discredited by a number of studies, including 
some carried out by its own chief economist. 
The Principle of Prudence would suggest that the cen-
tral bank might at least listen to its own chief economist 
on the matter and avoid using the RWA measure. 
So what does the central bank do? 
It adopts a capital ratio with an RWA denominator as its 
preferred capital ratio. 
Example 4
The central bank has a choice over which of two core 
capital measures – CET1 and Tier 1 – to use in its lever-
age ratio stress tests. 
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The Principle of Prudence would suggest that it go for 
the more conservative (i.e., narrower) capital meas-
ure, because there are demonstrable problems with the 
broader one: CoCos and all that. 
So what does the central bank do? 
It chooses the broader capital measure that is compro-
mised by CoCos.
Example 5
The central bank has a choice over which of two denom-
inators – LE or TA – to use in its leverage ratio stress 
tests. 
The Principle of Prudence would suggest that in each 
case the central bank choose the maximum of the two.  
So what does the central bank do? 
It adopts the denominator that is usually lowest. 
Example 6
The central bank faces a choice over whether to use 
book values or market values. A number of outside 
experts suggest that it should use market values or use 
the lower of book and market values.
The Principle of Prudence would suggest that the cen-
tral bank accept this advice even if its own in-house 
view is that book values are best. After all, it is just 
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conceivable that the outsiders might be right or might 
at least have a point, and it would be prudent to take 
account of that possibility, however remote that might 
be. 
So what does the central bank do? 
It chooses to stick with book values alone. 
Still on the book vs. market issue...
The central bank faces a choice over whether to adopt 
the advice of a distinguished external expert who rec-
ommends that even if the central bank prefers to base 
its conclusions on book values, then it should at least 
publish parallel market value results so that outside ana-
lysts could make up their own minds if they wished to. 
The Principle of Prudence would suggest that the cen-
tral bank accept this advice even though it thinks that 
book values are best. After all, the outsider might just be 
right and what is the harm in adopting his advice? 
So what does the central bank do? 
It still chooses to stick with book values only. You see, 
those outside analysts might get confused if the cen-
tral bank published parallel sets of numbers, even if the 
central bank offered them a clear explanation of how to 
read them. 
As it happens, each of these decisions also served to put 
the banking system in the best possible light. A skeptic 
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might then say that the central bank was making one 
imprudent decision after another. 
But there is an alternative view. Yes, it might look like 
each decision considered on its own was imprudent, 
but you have to consider prudence in the whole. This 
sounds counter-intuitive until you realise that the pur-
pose of the stress tests is to make the banking system 
look good. From that perspective, it would have  been 
imprudent for the central bank to have done anything 
else. 
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5. The 2016 stress 
tests
THE BANK’S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
STRESS TESTS
The Bank reports two headline results for its stress 
tests. The first of these is the stress test result for the 
CET1/RWA ratio and the second is the result for the 
Tier 1 leverage ratio, the ratio of Tier 1 capital to lever-
age exposure. 
The stress is assumed to start at the beginning of 2016 
and the peak of the stress is projected to occur at the 
end of 2017. The core results are as follows:
• The average CET1 ratio is projected to rise 
from 12.6 percent at the beginning of 2016 to 13.8 
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percent two years later under the baseline scenario, 
but to fall to 8.8 percent under the stress scenario.
• The average leverage ratio is projected to rise 
from 4.9 percent at the beginning of 2016 to 5.3 per-
cent two years later under the baseline scenario, but 
to fall to 3.9 percent under the stress scenario.64
From these results, the Bank concluded that the bank-
ing system as a whole is in good shape. 
For the individual banks, the test did not reveal any cap-
ital inadequacies for four financial institutions (HSBC, 
Lloyds, the Nationwide and Santander) but problems 
were identified for the other three: 
1. RBS failed to meet the hurdle rates for either test.
2. Barclays did not meet its CET1 SRP before AT1 
conversion. 
3. Some minor issues were identified with Standard 
Chartered.65 
64 Bank of England, “Stress testing the UK banking system: 2016 results,” 
November 2016, p. 7.
65 The Bank reports results for each bank in Annex 1 of its stress test report. 
It reports four different sets of peak-stress outcome: 1. Minimum stressed 
ratios before the impact of strategic management actions or AT1 conversion. 2. 
Minimum stressed ratios after the impact of strategic management actions (but 
non-dividend strategic management actions only) but before AT1 conversion. 3. 
Minimum stressed ratios after the impact of all strategic management actions 
(including CRD IV distribution restrictions) but before AT1 conversion. 4. 
Minimum stressed ratios after the impact of strategic management actions and 
after AT1 conversion. Of these I prefer to work with 3. It is important to consider 
the impact of all management actions (which rules out 1 and 2), but I have doubts 
about the reliability of assuming conversions of AT1 (so I prefer to avoid 4). 
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Based on these results, RBS was deemed to have failed 
the stress test and all the others were deemed to have 
passed it.
A STRESS TEST REALITY TEST
Before going any further, let’s put the stress tests 
through a simple reality test:
1. As of the third quarter 2016, the big four banks 
had about £205 billion in book value CET1 capital 
and about £149 in market value CET1. 
2. The stress scenario was almost as severe as the 
GFC. 
3. The big four experienced losses from the GFC 
of the order of £440 billion and counting.
4. Therefore we might expect that a shock similar 
to the GFC would more than wipe out the banks’ 
capital. 
5. Yet the Bank of England maintains that its stress 
tests demonstrate that the UK banking system 
would not only be able to withstand such a shock, 
but would still be in good shape afterwards. 
To me it seems that this doesn’t add up.
Of the seven banks involved in the exercise, the biggest 
five banks account for over 90% of the leverage expo-
sure. I now drop the other two institutions from further 
consideration because of their relatively small size. An 
additional reason for dropping them is that in the analy-
sis below I need institutions’ price-to-book (P2B) ratios 
and these are not available for these two institutions: 
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NW has no P2B ratio because it is a building society and 
Santander UK plc does not appear to have a published 
P2B ratio. 
A SERIES OF MISTAKES
In fact, the Bank made a number of mistakes in the 2016 
stress test exercise. 
Mistake #1: Reliance on RWAs
The first was to pay any credence at all to the ratio of 
CET1 capital to RWAs, because the RWA denominator 
is discredited. We should therefore throw these results 
away and focus on the leverage ratio results instead. 
The leverage ratio used by the Bank was the ratio of 
Tier 1 capital to leverage exposure. These outcomes are 
represented in Chart 5.1:
Chart 5.1: Stress Tier 1 Leverage Ratios
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The weighted average stressed leverage ratio is 3.95 per-
cent.66 Assuming that the pass standard is the 3 percent 
hurdle ratio, the average surplus over the pass standard 
is 0.95 percentage points and we get the results reported 
in Table 5.1:
Table 5.1: Results of Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Stress 
Tests
Bank Test result 
Barclays Pass
HSBC Pass
Lloyds Pass
RBS Fail
Standard Chartered Pass
RBS narrowly fails, but the other banks pass. 
Mistake #2: Use of book values instead of market 
values
However, these results are based on the book-value 
leverage ratio and the use of book values entails a sec-
ond mistake: the Bank should have used market values 
instead. To obtain the market values from the book val-
ues, I need first to obtain the corresponding P2B ratios.  
66 The weighted average is weighted by the relative size of the Leverage 
Exposure, which is a reasonable proxy for bank relative size.
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So consider the following P2B ratios from 
SharesTelegraph. These numbers apply to the banks on 
January 9th 2017 and are given in Table 5.2:67 
Table 5.2: Banks’ Price-to-Book Ratios January 9th 
2017
Bank Price-to-Book Ratio
Barclays 60%
HSBC 67%
Lloyds 98%
RBS 50%
Standard Chartered 47%
LE-Weighted average 66.1%
Notes: These refer to the P2B ratios prevailing at the end of day January 9th 2017 
and are based on FTSE data obtained from shares.telegraph.co.uk.
Applying these P2B ratios to obtain the market values 
from the book values gives us the results in Chart 5.2:
67 These P2B numbers were not available to the Bank at the time the stress tests 
were published, and one would not wish to criticise the Bank for not using values 
that were unavailable to it. I use these here as they were the ones that featured in 
the ITN report, but the overall results would not have been that much different 
had the Bank used the latest P2Bs available to it at the time. 
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Chart 5.2: Stress Market Leverage Ratios vs. 3%
 Hurdle Rate
We can summarise the results of this second set of 
stress tests as follows:
Table 5.3: Results of Market Tier 1 Leverage Ratios 
Stress Tests
Bank Test result 
Barclays Fail
HSBC Fail
Lloyds Pass
RBS Fail
Standard Chartered Fail
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All the banks now fail the test except Lloyds. The 
average stress leverage ratio is 2.65 percent and the 
weighted average shortfall is 0.35 percentage points. 
Mistake #3: Use of Tier 1 capital instead of CET1
However, the Bank used the wrong numerator. It should 
have used CET1 as the numerator instead of Tier 1 (see 
Chapter 3.1 above). Using market-based CET1 capi-
tal instead of market-based Tier 1 capital then gives the 
results in Chart 5.3:
Chart 5.3: Stress Market CET1 Leverage Ratios vs. 
3% Pass Standard
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Again, all the banks fail the test except Lloyds. The 
average stress leverage ratio falls to 2.4 percent and the 
average shortfall rises to 0.60 percentage points. 
One other adjustment to be made is to replace the 3% 
hurdle rate with the SRP for banks deemed to be sys-
temic. If we apply this pass standard, we get the same 
pass/fail results as before but the average shortfall 
across the system rises to 0.89 percentage points. 
Bear in mind that the results I have presented here take 
for granted virtually the entire stress test exercise as 
conducted by the Bank: the choice of scenario, the mod-
elling, the settings of the 3% hurdle rate and the SRPs 
etc. 
Had the Bank’s stress testers carried out these tests, 
they would have begun to see that the ‘banking system 
fixed’ narrative was beginning to unravel. 
SOURCES OF STRESS TEST BIAS AND 
HIDDEN VULNERABILITY IN UK BANKS
It is also important to examine any sources of poten-
tial bias and hidden vulnerability in our ‘best estimate’ 
results. It turns out that there are at least five significant 
sources of such problems. 
Sin bucket 
The first of these is the ‘sin bucket’ in the regulatory 
definition of CET1. Thomas F. Huertas explains:
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“Under Basel II, deferred tax assets, mortgage ser-
vicing rights and investments in the capital instru-
ments of other financial institutions were all 
included in core Tier 1 capital [which was the most 
conservative capital measure used in Basel II]. 
Under Basel III, these assets are in principle deduct-
ible from CET1 capital.”
One of the purposes of introducing CET1 in Basel III 
was to have a regulatory definition of core capital that 
excludes these softer capital items. However, the indus-
try lobbied to keep these items in. This result was a 
compromise by which these assets were not entirely 
deducted from CET1. As he continues:
“as a compromise the members agreed to put the 
aggregate of deductions under these categories into 
a so-called sin bucket and to restrict the deduction 
from CET1 capital to the amount in the sin bucket 
that exceeded a threshold equal to 15 percent of the 
bank’s CET1 capital.”68  
Got that? What it means is that the reported CET1 capi-
tal used for regulatory purposes can include these softer 
capital instruments and their inclusion might inflate the 
reported measure by up to 1/0.85 -1 = 17.5% relative to a 
notional ‘clean’ CET1 that fully excludes them. 
68 See Huertas, op. cit.,p. 23 and Basel Committee, June 2011, op. cit., pp. 
21-6 and Annex 2.
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In short, if we agree that we want a ‘clean’ CET1 that 
does not include such instruments, then the reported 
CET1 has the potential to be biased upwards by up to 
17.5%. 
Baseline versus stress P2B
My market-value numbers were based on the P2B ratios 
prevailing on January 9th 2017. In principle I should 
have used the stress P2B ratios – those prevailing when 
the stress scenario is most severe. However, I couldn’t 
use the stress P2Bs because the Bank did not report 
them and I have no idea what stress P2Bs they might 
have used, or how they or even whether they used any 
stress P2Bs at all. 
Let’s go back to first principles. We have the book value 
Book and the market value Market and
(1)                             Market= P2B× Book  
We also have initial values and post-stress values of 
these variables. Therefore: 
(2)                             Marketinitial=  P2Binitial× Bookinitial  
(3)                             Marketstress=  P2Bstress× Bookstress  
We need to select the actual capital measure and I used 
CET1. (2) and (3) then become:
(4)                             Marketinitial=  P2Binitial× Book CET1initial  
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(5)                             Marketstress=  P2Bstress× Book CET1stress
Now consider what we do and do not know. We know 
Book CET1initial and we know  P2Binitial. Granted that we 
know these two items, we can infer Marketinitial from (4). 
This is standard practice but I am really interested in 
Marketstress.
The Bank then does its stress test to come up with a 
number for Book CET1stress. Whether that number is any 
good is another issue, but lets take that as given here. 
Once we have P2Bstress  then it follows by (5) that we also 
have the stress market value, Marketstress. 
All that then remains is to obtain a value for P2Bstress, 
but as the Bank didn’t report any P2Bstress number in its 
stress test report the best I could do was to use P2Binitial 
as a substitute. 
However, I believe that any reasonable  P2Bstress is likely 
to be (considerably) lower than P2Binitial because dur-
ing a stress prices tend to approach their firesale values 
whereas book values may fall, but not by as much. Two 
examples:
• On January 1st 2007, the average P2B ratio for 
the big four UK banks was 190 percent, but during 
the Global Financial Crisis, it fell to 33 percent.69 
69 To illustrate, Table B.2. on p. 30 of the Bank’s November 2016 Financial 
Stability Report indicates that the big 4 UK banks’ average P2B fell from 190% at 
the start of 2007 to 33% during the GFC.
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• Banks’ P2Bs (or more precisely, their ratios of 
market value to par values) fell sharply in the crisis 
that occurred after the failure of the Herstatt Bank 
in 1974. For example, the UK merchant bank Hill 
Samuel saw its price-to-par value fall to a low of 25 
percent before recovering. 
If this belief (that P2Bstress << P2Binitial) is correct, then 
my P2Bstress numbers would be too high and the ‘correct’ 
stress test results would have been worse than my esti-
mates suggested, i.e., my ‘pessimistic’ stress-test num-
bers would not have been pessimistic enough.
Hidden off-balance sheet leverage
There is a lot of hidden off-balance sheet (OBS) lever-
age caused by positions that do not appear on the bal-
ance sheet but involve further risk exposure. Sources 
of OBS exposure include: operating leases; contingent 
liabilities, including those involving unconsolidated 
companies that are not fully owned by the parent com-
pany; rules that allow netting offsets that hide imper-
fectly hedged risks; securitisation and Special Purpose 
Vehicles; Total Return Swaps; Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS); Collateralised Debt Obligations; Collateralised 
Loan Obligations and failed sale rules. 
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Hidden OBS leverage is a hideously difficult sub-
ject, however, and I cannot begin to do it justice here.70 
Suffice to note that many of these instruments are 
explicitly designed to game the accounting or Basel 
capital rules, their purpose being to hide risks or 
exploit arbitrage possibilities to reduce regulatory cap-
ital charges (e.g., to game RWAs). Indeed, one can say 
that the core purpose of credit derivatives is to game 
the Basel risk weights by allowing banks to move assets 
from the banking book to the trading book where they 
are subject to much lower capital charges. Consider 
this quote from Janet Tavakoli’s textbook on credit 
derivatives: 
“The driving force for this revolution in banking is 
the fact that the BIS risk weighting of the trading 
counterparty will become irrelevant.” 
Meaning that the driving force behind credit derivatives 
is to make the risk weights irrelevant and so achieve 
much higher leverage, most of which will be hidden:
“The magnitude of the credit exposure as expressed 
by trading models will determine regulatory capital 
requirements. All banks will have an incentive to fig-
ure out ways to move assets from the bank book to 
the credit derivatives trading book. Trades, which 
70 Gordon Ker provides a nice overview: see G. Kerr, The Law of Opposites: 
Illusory Profits in the Financial Sector, Cobden Partners and Adam Smith 
Institute, 2011, available at http://www.thebrokenwindow.net/papers/A/ASI_
Law_of_opposites.pdf. 
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did not make sense from a past regulatory perspec-
tive, will make sense in the future whether the bank 
is buying or selling credit protection. The regulatory 
capital charge in the trading book is a fraction of the 
charge in the bank book, and exposure netting makes 
trading book management viable [or seem so: KD].”71
Ms. Tavakoli’s analysis looks awfully prescient given 
that she wrote these words almost 20 years ago. Now 
bear in mind that credit risk modeling was Basel II’s 
‘single big thing’ and you can see why Basel II was 
doomed to fail. Bear in mind too that credit modeling is 
a central feature of Basel III.72 
We should also keep in mind that the hidden OBS expo-
sures will mean that the true ‘at risk’ exposures will be 
greater (and potentially much greater) than indicated 
by regulatory measures such as TA or LE, and thus the 
true levels of leverage will potentially be much greater 
than suggested by regulatory leverage ratios. The result 
71 J. Tavakoli, Credit Derivatives: A Guide to Instruments and Applications, 
New York and Chichester: Wiley, 1998, p. 241. 
72 Basel II’s Advanced Measurement Approach to op risk modeling failed as 
well, and its replacement, the Standard Measurement Approach (SMA) threatens 
to cause systemic problems of its own. To quote a recent study, the SMA “may 
present significant systemic risk, as large global systemically important financial 
institutions are incentivized to take more risk on the one hand and invest less in 
risk management on the other.” See J. Hinchliffe, “The Death of One Thousand 
Flowers or the AMA Reborn?” (2016) Journal of Operational Risk, Volume 11, 
No. 4, p. 79. 
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is that no-one can tell from the published information 
how leveraged a bank really is. 
Level 1, Level 2 and Level 2 positions
Another insight into hidden vulnerability is given by 
the Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 fair valuations of banks’ 
marketable positions.  Roughly speaking:
Level 1  assets have readily observable prices and reli-
able fair market values. Level 1 assets include listed 
stocks, government bonds, or any assets that have a reg-
ular “mark to market” mechanism for pricing. 
Level 2 (or ‘mark to model’) assets do not have directly 
observed market values and are traded less frequently 
in thin markets, but have (hopefully approximate) fair 
values that can be obtained from models calibrated to 
observed market prices. Examples include some corpo-
rate and most municipal bonds. Level 2 valuations are 
at best approximate and can sometimes be gamed by 
selecting the model that gives the preferred valuations. 
Level 3 (or ‘mark to myth’) assets are highly illiquid and 
can only be fair-valued using models calibrated to guess-
timates of key parameters. Level 3 valuations are unre-
liable and potentially highly gameable, because both 
models and calibrations can be chosen to manipulate 
valuations and this gaming is difficult for outsiders to 
detect. Examples include asset-backed and mortgage-
backed securities and many forms of CDS. The experi-
ence of the GFC showed that Level 3 positions can be 
wiped out in a major crisis. 
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Table 5.4 gives the 5 big banks’ Level 1, Level 2 and 
Level 3 positions for the end of 2016 expressed as per-
centages of their CET1 capital:
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Barclays assets 174% 1,060% 60%
Barclays liabilities 57% 980% 31%
HSBC assets 368% 427% 9%
HSBC liabilities 40% 54% 5%
Lloyds assets 479% 214% 3%
Lloyds liabilities 358% 215% 20%
RBS assets 176% 1,030% 15%
RBS liabilities 64% 998% 10%
St. Ch. assets 176% 341% 6%
St. Ch. liabilities 7% 216% 2%
Notes: Based on banks’ 2016 Annual Reports.
Here are the main takeaways:
• The Level 1 numbers indicate significant mar-
ket risk exposure to Level 1 positions. For example, 
Barclays’ Level 1 assets are 174 percent of CET1, so 
a 20 percent fall in assets values would imply a loss 
of almost 35 percent of CET1. 
• The Level 2 numbers indicate large exposures 
to Level 2 positions. Barclays’ Level 2 assets are 
1,060 percent of CET1 capital. All the banks are 
highly exposed not only to Level 2 positions’ mar-
ket risk, but also to gameability and other weak-
nesses in the models used to value these positions. 
• The Level 3 numbers indicate relatively low 
exposures to Level 3 positions. The exception is 
Barclays, whose Level 3 assets are equivalent to 60 
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percent of CET1. Bearing in mind the unreliability 
of Level 3 valuations, this exposure is a red flag. 
We should not assume that banks’ assets and liabili-
ties are in any way perfectly hedged, e.g., we should not 
assume that Barclays’ net Level 3 position is equal to its 
Level 3 asset position of 60 percent minus its Level 3 lia-
bility position of 31 percent. This last point reminds us 
that all these valuations are based on assumptions about 
netting and hedge effectiveness that may not be reliable 
and are also open to gaming. 
Inadequate accounting standards
A final source of bias is inadequate accounting stand-
ards.  The weaknesses of IFRS accounting standards 
have been well-documented: they include the overvalu-
ation of retained earnings, asset values and profits; and 
inadequate provisions for expected losses.73 To quote a 
recent letter in the Financial Times: 
“... better forecasts and better weatherproofing both 
depend on a deeper problem being resolved: the poor 
quality of the numbers we are relying on to tell us 
what banks’ capital actually is. Is the stated “capital” 
in fact capable of absorbing lending or trading losses 
that inevitably come in a downturn?
73 For more on these issues, see, e.g., Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, UK 
and Irish Banks Capital Losses – Post Mortem, September 2011, or No Stress II, 
Chapter Two, section 6. 
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“At the heart of the crisis would appear to sit faulty 
accounts and unreliable audits. In the EU alone, 
between September 2008 and the end of 2010, more 
than 300 banks went cap in hand to governments 
for support—in the form of capital injections, asset 
relief, liquidity aid or debt guarantees. Few banks 
[had been] identified as having insufficient capital 
[prior to September 2008].”74
All of these banks had previously been signed off as cap-
ital adequate by their regulators. That is some failure by 
the regulatory system. To continue:
“The fact is that bank accounts — drawn up accord-
ing to IFRS accounting standards—showed “profit” 
and “capital” that overstated their true strength. 
Supplementary regulatory disclosures of capital 
under the Basel framework help little as they lean 
heavily on these faulty accounting numbers, and are 
themselves unaudited.”
Further concerns about accountancy standards were 
expressed by Iain Coke, the head of Financial Services 
at the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England 
and Wales in May 2017. “[M]any people were more 
confident than they should be” about banks’ key reg-
ulatory capital ratios, he stated. “There is almost an 
74 N. Landell-Mills, K. Quinn, E. Tracey, R. Collinge, R. Talbut and F. Curtiss, 
“Clearer picture of banks’ capital is required to help avert crises,” Financial 
Times, January 12th 2017. 
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assumption that someone else is poring” over them. 
These concerns came a month after the Central Bank 
of Ireland had ordered all banks operating in Ireland to 
review their operating procedures after an investigation 
there found that standards “were significantly below 
what is expected”.75 
There is also evidence that IFRS overvaluations of bank 
assets can be large. Consider this quote from an Irish 
Parliamentary Committee:
“IAS 39 operates on an incurred loss basis as 
opposed to an expected loss basis. Under IAS 39, 
NAMA [National Asset Management Agency] 
could not have provided for expected future losses. 
At the end of 2013, the board expected future losses 
but could not provide for them under IAS 39. In set-
ting the £1.3 billion minimum price, the board was, 
in effect, recognising and bringing up front, losses of 
at least £175 million. The board was aware that the 
end of 2013 £1.49 billion carrying value needed to 
be adjusted to take account of losses that it expected 
to take in future years but could not yet recognise in 
its end of 2013 accounts under IFRS. The fact that 
there was an actual loss of £162 million on the sale 
which was recognised in 2014 accounts is not in 
dispute.”76 
75 N. Megaw, “Banks overconfident about capital strength, accountancy body 
warns,” Financial Times May 14th 2016. 
76 Dáil Éireann, Committtee of Public Accounts, November 24th 2016, p. 15.
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£162 million divided by £1.49 billion implies an overval-
uation of a little over 12 percent. Tim Bush provides an 
explanation:
“The debate was necessary due to discrepan-
cies between what assets were being held at in the 
accounts and what they were being sold at. NAMA 
was having to defend the level of discounts it was 
taking by referring to the significant accounting dis-
crepancy. Given that a 12% overvaluation of assets 
is sufficient to more than wipe out the assets of a 
bank with even 10% leverage, and given the Bank of 
England’s target leverage ratio is only 3%, then it is 
difficult to reconcile that with, not only Dr Carney’s 
confidence in IFRS, but his confidence in the bank-
ing system with IAS 39 still operative.
“However, with one other fact even that pales into 
insignificance. The NAMA portfolio in question had 
already been acquired from the Bank of Ireland at a 
44% discount to the value booked in the accounts, i.e. 
the portfolio had been overvalued by nearly 79%.77 
Such levels of overstatement easily explain the col-
lapse of not only the other Irish banks, but HBOS, 
RBS, Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock in the 
UK.”78 
It is important to appreciate that because of leverage, 
even small errors in reported asset values can translate 
77 Source: Bank of Ireland: Group Overview y/e 31 December 2010.
78 T. Bush, “Rights Issues and Capital,” Pensions & Investments Research 
Consultants Ltd., forthcoming report.
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into large errors in the reported leverage ratio or capital 
ratio. Suppose that there is a 1 percent overstatement in 
the reported asset value.79  Then it is easy to show that 
the reported capital will be subject to an error of much 
the same (absolute, not percentage) magnitude as the 
error in the reported asset value. So if the bank has a 
reported capital to asset ratio of 3 percent, then the true 
capital to asset ratio will be 3 percent minus 1 percent 
= 2 percent. If the error in the reported asset value is 2 
percent, the true capital to asset ratio will be 1 percent, 
and if the error in the reported asset value is 3 percent 
or more, then the true capital to asset ratio will be zero 
percent or negative. In short, an accounting system that 
is prone to over-value asset values can lead to a situation 
where banks’ true capital ratios are much lower than 
they are reported to be. 
Nor is it just reported asset values that are the prob-
lem. If retained earnings or profits are inflated – and 
the IFRS rules give bank management plenty of scope 
and incentive to game these figures – then inappropri-
ate distributions of dividends and bonuses will be made, 
which will have the effect of secretly depleting bank 
capital and inflating reported capital figures – and once 
again, you cannot tell from the reported figures what 
the true situation actually is.80
79 Suppose that assets are reported with an error x. Since capital equals assets 
minus liabilities, then capital will also be reported with the same error x. If c is 
the true capital and A the true asset value, then the reported capital ratio will be 
equal to (c+x)/(A+x) which will be approximately (c+x)/A if the bank is highly 
leveraged.
80 There are also important data, data systems and data reporting issues which 
are discussed further in No Stress II, Chapter Two, section 5. 
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It is not for nothing that that the balance sheets of the 
big banks have been described as the blackest of black 
holes.
CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions are stark. The Bank of England made a 
number of errors in its stress test exercise and correct-
ing for these errors leads to a much gloomier assessment 
of the financial health of the UK banking system. Most, 
if not all, of the big banks would have failed the test and 
are demonstrably capital inadequate. As if that were not 
bad enough, my ‘best estimates’ of the stress leverage 
ratios are subject to number of upward biases and other 
sources of vulnerability that suggest that the true pic-
ture is even worse, and potentially much worse, than my 
numbers suggest. 
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6. Deflating the 
Bank’s Treasury 
Committee 
evidence
This Chapter examines the January 11th 2017 Treasury 
Committee meeting at which the Bank witnesses faced 
a grilling from MPs on a range of different subjects, the 
common denominator being the Bank’s credibility or, 
rather, the lack of it. 
Let’s go through the salient points. 
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BREXIT AND MICHAEL FISH MOMENTS
The week before, Andy Haldane had had his “Michael 
Fish moment.”81 Speaking at an event in London, he 
admitted that economic forecasts had been wrong 
before the financial crisis, and that criticisms about 
forecasts being wrong on the immediate impact of a 
Brexit vote were a “fair cop”. Prominent amongst those 
who made these erroneous forecasts was the Bank itself. 
So it was hardly a surprise that the Chair started off 
by asking Carney if he still stood by the Bank’s earlier 
Brexit analysis. To quote:
Q120 Chair: “… I feel I should begin by asking you, 
Governor, whether you agree with your chief econ-
omist that the Bank of England has been having a 
“Michael Fish moment” or, as he suggests, two of 
them.”
Dr Mark Carney: “One of the advantages of ban-
ishing groupthink is that one does not always agree 
with everything that is said by colleagues.”
81 For non-UK readers and UK readers those below a certain age, Michael 
Fish is a well-loved BBC weatherman who made a famous forecast on October 
15th 1987: “Earlier on today, apparently, a woman rang the BBC and said she 
heard there was a hurricane on the way ... well, if you’re watching, don’t worry, 
there isn’t!” That evening, the worst storm to hit South East England for three 
centuries caused record damage and killed 19 people.
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Now groupthink is an organisational dysfunction that 
cannot just be banished and it seems to me that the 
Bank of England has been riddled with it for a long time, 
but let’s move on. 
Carney did not share Haldane’s view. He acknowledged 
that the Bank had concluded in November “that the 
biggest risks to financial stability in the UK are global 
and not Brexit-related”, i.e., the Bank had changed its 
position on Brexit and hence the headlines about the 
Bank’s Brexit U-turn. 
However, he suggested that this change in its position 
was not some horrendous Michael Fish forecast error, 
but actually reflected the success of the measures that 
the Bank took in the wake of the Brexit vote:
Q121 Chair: [Implied question:] “We did not have a 
Michael Fish moment because, in this case, the fore-
caster can influence the outcome.”
Dr Mark Carney: “With respect to financial stabil-
ity risks around the referendum, I do think we helped 
to make the weather, if I can say that. Meteorologists 
predict the weather; we helped to make the weather 
in that we catalysed contingency plans, actions, pre-
positioning of collateral, other steps with other major 
central banks and better risk management, which 
helped to ensure that this was a smooth process and 
put the country in a better place to take advantage of 
the opportunity [of Brexit?].”
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Put another way, the Bank’s forecasting ‘failure’ was 
actually a success because the Bank’s actions prevented 
the outcome that it had forecast! 
Now this is a clever argument, but I don’t buy it. Let’s 
suppose that the Bank had been right about Brexit risk 
before the vote. But if this were so, why didn’t the Bank 
at the time anticipate that it would have responded 
as it did, which was easy enough to do. It should then 
have said that yes, Brexit was a risk but the Bank has 
the means to handle it so there is nothing much to 
worry about after all. The Bank didn’t say that, how-
ever. Instead, it sounded warnings that turned out to be 
wrong. So Haldane is right to plead out on this one. 
This argument is also unscientific because you cannot 
defend forecasts that cannot be falsified. By this logic, 
every time that the Bank gets a forecast wrong, it could 
claim that it did not really get it wrong, because the fore-
casted event was averted by its own policies and but for 
those the forecast would have been right. Monetary pol-
icy is now so skilfully carried out that those long and 
variable lags of old have been abolished. By this logic, 
the Bank would be able to claim that it was right when-
ever its forecasts were right, and that it was also right 
whenever its forecasts were wrong. Its forecasts would 
never be falsifiable. 
If you are still not persuaded, consider this example. 
Michael Fish makes a weather forecast in 1987 and his 
forecast turns out to be wrong. Fair cop, says an embar-
rassed Mr. Fish. Now imagine that Michael Fish fore-
casts a hurricane in 2017 and again gets it wrong. 
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“You’ve done it again, Michael!” everyone says. “Oh 
no I haven’t,” he responds. “Yes, the forecast as such 
was incorrect, but this is not a fair cop.” You see mete-
orology has moved on and in the meantime Michael has 
learned to control the weather, and the reason his hur-
ricane did not materialise was because he took measures 
to avert it. Michael wants credit for averting his hurri-
cane and I am the first to acknowledge the splendid job 
he did. But I still have to ask him why he frightened the 
hell out of us with his weather forecast when he knew 
that he would use his meteorological magical powers to 
stop it. 
FORECASTING FAILURES
A little later, Jacob Rees-Mogg again raised the issue of 
forecasting:  
Q146 Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg: “… In his “dappled 
world” speech in early November, Mr Haldane 
raised some really interesting questions about what 
I think he called “methodological monoculture” 
and the concern that forecasters were so guilty of 
groupthink that it was very hard to get anything 
valuable out of them except in times of stability. 
You know that I have been critical of the forecasts 
the Bank made about Brexit. How can the Bank 
take account of what Mr Haldane is saying and get 
to a point where it is able to forecast when there are 
discontinuities?”
Dr Mark Carney: “One of the ways we take account 
of what Mr Haldane says is by him being the chief 
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economist of the Bank of England. One of the 
responsibilities of the chief economist of the Bank of 
England is the preparation of the economic forecast, 
which is why he is a member of the MPC.”
Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg: “His forecasts have been the 
same as everybody else’s.”
Rees-Mogg: 1, Carney: 0. Then Dr. Carney went on to 
explain that the FPC was mainly concerned with the 
tail than the central tendency:
“The way we have to get better—and where, I would 
suggest, to some extent the Bank of England and the 
profession have got better relative to pre-crisis—is 
through a much more explicit focus on the tail: what 
could go wrong, as opposed to what is going right.” 
There is however no hard evidence that any of them are 
any better at tail risk analysis than they were pre-GFC: 
Brexit tail risk comes to mind, for instance. To return to 
Dr. Carney:
“We have to continually ask ourselves what can go 
wrong.  … Somebody can legitimately stand here 
and say, “Really? You ran a stress test with the whole 
economy going down 2%, commercial real estate off 
30%, housing off 30%, unemployment at 9%, a market 
crash and misconduct all coming at the same time. Is 
that really a severe but plausible scenario?”
Bingo. They might also ask why such a severe fall in 
housing led to such a low loss rate in their stress test, 
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when experience elsewhere indicates that a large fall 
in real estate leads to much higher loss rates. Or they 
might ask whether there were any outsiders who might 
have expressed any doubts about the reliability of their 
stress analysis. So we return to the central issue of 
whether the stress tests are any good.
THE STRESS TESTS
Shortly after, Steve Baker subjected the Bank witnesses 
to a searching cross-examination on that subject that 
flushed out the main problems. He began by asking 
Martin Taylor if he was surprised that all banks didn’t 
pass the stress test. 
Mr. Taylor’s response boiled down this:
“It was a hell of a stress …. the combined size of the 
shock was larger than we have had in previous years 
…” 
A hell of a stress? A severe one to be sure, but one can-
not defend blanket claims to the effect that the 2016 
exercise was the most severe yet unless they are suita-
bly qualified. For example, the 2014 exercise had unem-
ployment rising to 12%, whereas the 2016 exercise only 
had unemployment rising to only 9.5 percent. By that 
yardstick, the 2016 exercise was considerably less stress-
ful than the earlier one. The true situation is more 
nuanced than Mr. Taylor suggests. 
Mr. Baker then asked Anil Kashyap to comment on the 
ITN report and Sir John Vickers’ statement that, nine 
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years after the financial crisis, progress to ensure that 
the banking system is more resilient had been “really 
disappointing”.
Professor Kashyap did not share that view. We “have 
raised the amount of capital in the system immensely” 
he said, before going on to explain why he regarded the 
stress test programme as “one of the most stability-
enhancing things that have come into the regulatory 
toolkit.”
Well, lets stick to facts. Going into 2007, the big four 
UK banks had £116 billion in book Tier 1 capital. As of 
the end of 2016q3, they had book CET1 capital equal 
to about £205 billion. This is an increase but hardly an 
immense one. Now I grant that CET1 is of superior 
quality to Tier 1, but this is an increase of less than £90 
billion – and this comparison does not take account of 
the way banks’ market values have deteriorated since 
2007. 
And for the merits of the stress test programme, that is 
exactly the point at issue. 
Mr. Baker then turned to Alex Brazier and asked him 
his view of Vickers’ claim that the stress tests should be 
“more rigorous, more robust”. 
Mr. Brazier responded by saying that anything Sir John 
said he was very keen to consider, but after very careful 
consideration the Bank chose not to agree for a variety 
of reasons which he then goes into:
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“On the issue of the rigour and robustness of the 
stress tests overall, this year’s test … was one in 
which the scenario was at least as tough as the finan-
cial crisis.” 
Not so. To quote p. 6 of the Bank’s own stress test 
report: “Overall, the UK stress is roughly equivalent to 
that experienced during the financial crisis, albeit with 
a shallower fall in domestic output …” So the Bank’s 
stress scenario was not quite as stressful as the GFC. 
“The losses that resulted for this group of banks 
were five times what they experienced in the finan-
cial crisis.” 
Not so. Cumulative losses to date for the big 4 are of the 
order of £440 billion.82  
“The losses were such, in terms of the decline of 
their capital ratio, that they would have wiped out 
the entire capital base of the British banking system 
in 2007. That is how severe the test was.” 
Not so. Mr. Brazier is referring here to the £44 billion 
projected losses, but as I have pointed out, the Tier 1 
capital of the big four banks alone going into 2007 was 
£116 billion and a loss of £44 billion does not wipe out 
capital of more than £116 billion.  
“On the rather narrower point of using market-based 
measures of equity, it is worthy of consideration, but 
82  See Ferguson, “UK bank ‘stress’ test,” p. 2.
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let me tell you why I come down on the side of not 
using it. Put aside the fact that the market value of 
banks’ equity is currently higher than the regulatory 
measure that we use. For the major banks, the mar-
ket value of their shareholders’ equity is £270 billion. 
In the stress test, we assume they have £230 billion-
worth of regulatory capital, so it actually points to a 
slightly stronger banking system than the one we use 
in the stress test. I do not want to use that, because it 
includes things that I do not want to include in regu-
latory capital.”
This is a straw man argument and also one that implic-
itly concedes a major problem with what the Bank did. 
Neither Vickers nor I are suggesting that the Bank of 
England should have used the market value of banks’ 
equity as its capital measure. We are saying that they 
should have made appropriate market-value-based 
adjustments to their book values of core capital. 
Going further, the Bank should not have used Tier 1 as 
its core capital measure at all. As I explained in Chapter 
3.1, Tier 1 is less attractive as a core capital measure 
than CET1 because Tier 1 includes CoCo bonds and 
CET1 excludes them. Since CoCo instruments are not 
of the same quality as CET1, the leverage ratio stress 
tests should be based on CET1 and not Tier 1. 
I am not sure of Mr. Brazier’s numbers because his 
dates are not too clear, but let’s consider the situation as 
the end of 2016q3. Using data from their financial state-
ments, the big four banks had about £303.5 billion in 
shareholder equity. I understand him to be saying that 
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the Bank used Tier 1 capital, which was about £245 bil-
lion. He then seems to suggest that this one reduction 
is enough and I say it is not. The Bank should then have 
reduced further to CET1 capital, which was about £205 
billion. But this figure is the book CET1 value, and the 
corresponding market value of that CET1 capital was 
about £149 billion. One should then do the stress anal-
ysis and make sure that the stress market-value CET1 
uses a stress P2B which ought to be lower than the cur-
rent or baseline P2B. 
To return to Mr. Brazier: 
“Put aside, as well, the fact that, if you had done this 
before the crisis, you would have been led completely 
astray, because banks were being valued extremely 
highly by a market that was effectively mispricing 
risk across the board. You would have been led to 
the conclusion that the British banking system was 
remarkably resilient, and, as forecasting errors go, 
that would have been quite a good one.”
Touché! Banks’ share prices did signal problems in 
advance of the crisis and, to quote the Bank’s own chief 
economist, “market-based measures of capital offered 
clear advance signals of impending distress” whereas 
the Bank’s own models and all its preferred metrics did 
not: Michael Fish again.83 
“Putting those things aside, what really matters is that 
we include in the stress test the things that the market 
83  Haldane, 2011, p. 8.
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price is reflecting, to the extent that we believe them. 
Right now, those market prices are typically reflecting a 
fairly weak earnings outlook, consistent with recent past 
performance, and the prospect of quite significant 
conduct redress fines. Those things are incorporated 
in the stress test. We should challenge ourselves, and 
we do, to say: “Given what we are incorporating in 
the stress test, is there anything else in the market 
valuation that we cannot explain with these results 
and that we should include?” The answer we came 
to after rigorous analysis this year, last year, and the 
year before is no.
“The underlying argument is that the UK banks 
are sitting on currently unrealised credit losses. We 
should entertain that possibility, and we look very 
carefully, as we do in the report, at market measures 
of their loan portfolios, at their non-performing loan 
rates relative to their provisions and capital, and none 
of those indicators give us cause for concern about that 
particular point. We are confident that the things in the 
stress test are consistent with what the market is pricing 
in.” (My italics)
My interpretation of Mr. Brazier’s comments is that 
the Bank does take some account of market valuations, 
and I am very pleased to hear that. But what worries 
me from the parts of the passage that I have italicized 
is that he appears to be discussing the baseline scenario, 
and the stress scenario is supposed to be more severe. 
Look at the last sentence: “We are confident that the 
things in the stress test are consistent with what the market 
is pricing in.” He appears to be suggesting that the Bank 
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applies current P2B ratios in its stress scenario, instead 
of, well, stressing them. That might be a problem. 
Then there was the question of the replicability of the 
results I had given ITN:
Q174 Mr Steve Baker: “I want to ask you a cou-
ple of questions, Governor, in a moment, if you will 
just bear with me. Mr Brazier, before I come to the 
Governor, can you be absolutely clear? Sir John’s 
arguments were taken, and ITV had my friend and 
colleague Kevin Dowd run some numbers, and only 
Lloyds passed the tests. Now, if it were the case that 
only Lloyds would pass if one took into account Sir 
John’s recommendation on valuations, then we 
would have a very serious capital problem, wouldn’t 
we? Can you just confirm that you are not concerned 
that the only robust bank is Lloyds?”
Alex Brazier: “I do not share that conclusion. I have 
had someone rerun the numbers, and, to be honest, 
I cannot replicate those numbers using the data of 
the bank valuations. Even so, the general point still 
applies, which is whether it is the right thing to do.”
So Mr. Brazier’s team were unable to replicate my find-
ings. Well, let me help them. The single biggest change 
is to apply a P2B number to the book value number, 
even to the Tier 1 book value, but preferably to a CET1 
book value number. Then you get close to the numbers I 
gave to ITN. 
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However, let me stress that one really needs to apply 
stressed P2B numbers not current or baseline ones and 
that would likely have produced even poorer outcomes, 
but I was unable to do that because the Bank did not 
report any stressed P2B numbers.
Governor Carney then offered his view: 
“I would just make the point that there is a double 
count here, as Mr Brazier just said. Price to book 
ratio shows the market cap versus the book value of 
equity. We do not use the book value of equity. We 
take the book value of equity, and then we reduce 
it for things that will not be there when times are 
tough. That is the lesson of 2008: no deferred tax 
assets, because if you are a lousy bank, those are not 
real assets; no goodwill, because you have no intangi-
ble value; no value to investments in other financial 
institutions, because, if times are tough, those are 
probably worth nothing as well.
“The fact is that the book value is reduced substan-
tially, for regulatory capital purposes. What has hap-
pened here is that they have taken that lower num-
ber and multiplied it by the ratio, so they have dou-
ble counted it. I am sorry; they could have come and 
asked us how to do the calculation and we would 
have helped them with it, but they did not. They 
have just double counted on it.”
I am puzzled at Governor Carney’s suggestion that I 
must have made a double-count error given that no-
one at the Bank had seen my spreadsheets and that his 
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colleague had just told the Committee that the Bank 
was unable to reproduce my numbers. 
He is right however that deductions need to be made 
from shareholder equity. These include, e.g., intangi-
bles and unreliable capital instruments such as AT1. 
Therefore it is not enough to reduce down to Tier 1; it 
is also necessary to reduce further to CET1. From this 
starting value, it should have reduced it further again 
to obtain the book CET1 under the stress. It should 
then have obtained the corresponding projected mar-
ket value CET1 under the stress, which it apparently 
did not, and it should have obtained the stress market 
value CET1 by multiplying by the projected stress P2B, 
not the latest or baseline scenario P2B. The Bank itself 
made a number of mistakes here – and they were big 
ones. 
And so the core of his rebuttal – “What has happened 
here is that they have taken that lower [capital] num-
ber and multiplied it by the ratio, so they have double 
counted it” – is simply wrong. 
I did not double-count; instead, the Bank did not count 
down far enough. 
Governor Carney then continued:
“That raises an important point, which is what the 
market value, whether it is a CDS spread or price to 
book value, tells you. As typical glass-half-empty, 
prudent central bankers, we care a lot more about 
when it is below book value. What is it telling you 
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and why? We look at the asset quality. We run £100 
billion-worth of impairments through these guys in 
two years, which is how you stress the value of the 
things. We did that, and let me underscore that you 
end up with capital that is twice what they had going 
into the financial crisis, after having had five times 
the losses.” 
The losses in the 2016 stress projection were not five 
times the losses over the peak of the GFC, but less than 
a tenth of them. 
“There is a point at which somebody says, “Do you 
have too much capital in the system?” as opposed to 
“Do you have enough?””
So the big four had £159 billion in book CET1 at the 
peak of the stress (and presumably considerably less in 
market value CET1) and this might be too much to pru-
dently ensure the resilience of banks with just under £5 
trillion or £5,000 billion in total assets? I don’t think so. 
“To take the market point and the return point seri-
ously, we do two things. One is to say, “In our stress 
test baseline, before the world goes poorly, what is 
the path of profits? Is it at all consistent with what 
the market is valuing?” You do a dividend discount 
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model and look at the various costs of equities.84 We 
end up with a price to book of about 0.75, which is 
roughly where the market is right now. Their base-
line is weak profitability.”
I.e., poor cash flows. However, those cash flows are the 
banks’ preferred means to rebuild their resilience given 
that (a) they are reluctant to issue more shares and (b) 
they cannot resort to asset sales because of the fire sale 
problem. OK, so Governor Carney explains the Bank’s 
pessimistic baseline analysis, but his statement tells 
us nothing about the (even more pessimistic?) stress 
scenario. 
All I can glean from the statements of the Bank wit-
nesses is that the stress scenario involved some pro-
jection of low future returns. But it would be nice to 
know more, e.g., did they, or did they not, stress the 
P2B ratios and, more generally, how do the baseline and 
stress scenarios differ from each other? Clearing up 
these issues would go a long way towards resolving con-
troversy over the tests.
84  From an outsider’s perspective, the Bank’s model is a black box, but even so, 
one can occasionally glimpse a rare ray of light going into it. In footnote 3 of his 
December 19th 2016 letter to Vickers, Governor Carney points out that the Bank 
used a 13 percent cost of equity in what I understand to be its baseline  scenario. 
This cost of equity is very high and well out of line with mainstream estimates 
that put it at under 5 percent. It is important that the Bank’s projections be 
based on credible calibrations and that the Bank give some assessment of the 
robustness/sensitivity of its results to key input assumptions.
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In the meantime, we can be thankful for the stress tests’ 
reassurance that bank share price weakness does not 
signal bank weakness. 
Let me end by returning to the subject of the weather. If 
the Bank can make the weather when it comes to Brexit, 
then it would also make sense for it to make the weather 
on banks’ low future profitability. It could do so by rais-
ing interest rates. If the banks are now resilient again, as 
the Bank maintains, then they should be able to with-
stand any shock entailed by such a move, and higher 
rates would boost banks’ net interest margins and 
thereby their profitability. Higher rates would also give 
the Bank some much needed room for manoeuvre if the 
economy were to go into recession again and the Bank 
then wished to respond in the traditional way by reduc-
ing rates to give the economy a boost. 
Just a thought. 
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7. The fatal flaws in 
the stress tests
There are many flaws with the stress tests that I 
addressed at some length in No Stress II. The majority 
of these are not just any old flaws, but fatal flaws, any 
one of which on its own would be enough to discredit the 
entire exercise. 
Here is a brief summary:
Flaw #1: The stress tests consider only one adverse 
stress scenario
A stress test is a model-based guess about what 
might happen and the world is an uncertain place. 
Consequently, if you choose to rely on such guesswork, 
then it would be unwise to rely on a single adverse 
scenario: no one scenario can give you confidence that 
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the banking system is safe in the face of all the other 
scenarios that you didn’t consider.
For example, what reassurance do the 2016 stress tests 
give us that the UK banking system will be safe if the 
next big shock emanates from the Eurozone or mainland 
Chinese banking systems, say? 
None.
And why? 
Because it did not even consider them. 
Flaw #2: The Bank’s stress scenario is insufficiently 
stressful
The chosen scenario was adverse but not especially so 
– a little less severe than the GFC in terms of its impact 
on GDP. Therefore the stress test gives us no idea what 
might happen if there were a shock bigger than the 
GFC. 
Such robustness issues are also highly non-linear. 
Even if we accepted that the Bank’s stress tests were 
correct in suggesting that the UK banking system could 
withstand a shock similar to the GFC and still be in good 
shape, then that still does not provide any reassurance 
that the system would still be well after a moderately 
larger shock. 
Suppose that a stress test on a bridge demonstrates that 
NO STRESS III 159
159
it can safely withstand a certain shock. Does that imply 
that it can withstand a bigger one? 
Flaw #3: The Bank’s modelling of the impact of its 
stress scenario on the UK banking system is clearly 
inadequate
The modelling of the feedback link between the stressed 
environment and the resulting bank losses is clearly 
inadequate because the Bank’s stress scenario produces 
implausibly mild projected losses for UK banks: 
Flaw #4: The Bank of England lacks the forecasting 
record to produce credible stress scenarios 
We can only have confidence in the Bank’s ‘forward-
looking’ stress projections of adverse scenarios if we 
can have confidence in the Bank’s forecasting record, 
but that record is positively dire: the Bank has had more 
Michael Fish moments than Michael Fish.
Flaw #5: Headline stress tests are undermined by 
their reliance on useless risk weights 
The Bank’s headline stress tests – those based on the 
ratio of CET1 capital to Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs) 
– are undermined by the hopeless RWA measure.  
A low RWA does not mean that the bank concerned has 
low risks; instead, it usually means that it is taking a lot 
of risks that are invisible to its risk measurement system. 
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Flaw #6: Stress tests are undermined by their 
reliance on useless risk models
The stress tests are undermined directly by their 
dependence on the Bank of England’s and the banks’ 
own risk models and indirectly by their reliance on the 
Basel capital adequacy regime, which itself also depends 
on risk models that have proven themselves to be 
useless.  The main reason why is because the models are 
used for risk management purposes and risk takers have 
an incentive to game model-based risk control systems: 
no model can take account of the ways in which it might 
be gamed. 
The risk models are therefore subject to a strong-form 
version of Goodhart’s Law by which any risk model will 
break down when used for risk control purposes.
Going deeper still, all these models including the stress 
tests merely give the illusion that financial markets are 
mathematizable, when experience shows that they are 
not. 
Flaw #7: The stress tests are undermined by core 
capital measures that overstate core capital and by 
leverage exposure measures that understate total 
risk exposure.
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Flaw #8: The pass standards used in the Bank of 
England’s stress tests were too low
A Tier 1 pass standard of 3 percent or a little more allows 
for high levels of leverage. For example, a 3 percent Tier 
1 pass standard allows for Tier 1 leverage of 33. Such a 
pass standard allows for even higher leverage in terms 
of book CET1 and for theoretically unlimited leverage 
in terms of market-value CET1.
The Bank’s pass standards are also less demanding than 
the higher minimum requirements coming through in 
the United States or the much higher minimum capital 
standards recommended by many experts.  
Flaw #9: Conclusions from stress tests are not robust 
to reasonable changes in the pass standards
Had the Bank increased the pass standards even 
modestly, then the weakness of the banks would have 
soon have become apparent. For example, had the pass 
standard been 4 percent in terms of book value CET1, 
then only HSBC and Standard Chartered would have 
passed; and had the pass standard been 4 percent in 
terms of market value CET1, then it would appear that 
all banks would have failed.85 
85  Strictly speaking, I can only be sure that the five biggest banks would have 
failed, as I don’t have P2B ratios for the other two. However, as these banks are 
not notably stronger than the big five, one would be surprised if they managed to 
pass when the big five do not.
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Flaw #10: The 2016 stress tests exhibit basic failures 
of due diligence
The 2016 stress testers failed to challenge the obviously 
implausible loss numbers their numbers were generating 
from a supposedly ‘hell of a stress’ stress scenario. They 
failed to stress test their stress test results against even 
moderate changes in the adversity of their scenario or in 
their pass standard. 
Any of these checks should have started to flag up 
problems that the stress testers missed.
Flaw #11: Regulatory stress tests involve an inherent 
confirmation bias
These failures highlight one of the major contradictions 
at the heart of regulatory stress testing: that they are 
used in practice not to challenge preconceived views, 
but to confirm them. 
Imagine that some central bank stress tester did 
a conscientious job and came to conclusions that 
contradicted the corporate line. They then reported 
them to the senior management who have publicly 
reassured us that the banking system is resilient. What do 
you think would happen then? Even if someone voiced 
a few doubts in a meeting, they would be drowned out 
by the prevailing collective groupthink, which in turn 
and for obvious reasons, would hardly be inconsistent 
with the senior management’s view. 
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This confirmation bias makes it difficult for a stress 
tester, however able, to spot warning signs – and the 
in-house culture of the central bank implies a lot of 
pressure to toe the line and not get a reputation for 
being ‘difficult’. 
Such people do not thrive in regulatory agencies: they 
are not welcome in them and they are soon weeded out. 
That is the way these organisations work. 
The credibility of the exercise is therefore undermined 
by the inability of in-house stress test experts to 
challenge the corporate line even if they were minded 
to and willing to resist the pressures to conform. The 
senior management can then say that their views are 
supported by a whole team of in-house experts who say 
that the stress tests are credible, severe and so on, and 
they would have a point. 
Flaw #12: The credibility of the stress tests is 
undermined by conflicted objectives, outside 
pressure and an inability to address the risks that 
regulators themselves create
The credibility of the stress tests is undermined by 
the conflict between the two main objectives of the 
exercises, namely, to determine the financial strength 
of the banking system and to promote confidence in the 
banking system. 
The credibility of the Bank’s stress tests is undermined 
by the pressures from the industry and from the 
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government under which it must operate, and both 
of these parties have a vested interest in the ‘banking 
system is sound’ narrative
The credibility of the stress tests is undermined by a 
massive blind spot at the heart of any central bank 
stress testing programme: the single biggest factor 
contributing to the GFC was the regulatory system 
itself, including the Bank, the FSA and the Basel 
system. So that regulatory system introduces stress tests 
to demonstrate the resilience of the banking system to 
the risks it faces, but how can those stress tests possibly 
take account of the risks to financial stability created 
by the regulatory system itself? There is, therefore, an 
inherent contradiction at the heart of regulatory stress 
tests: they can’t be expected to take account of the risks 
that the regulatory system itself creates – and these are 
the biggest risks of all.
Flaw #13: The credibility of the stress tests is 
undermined by Public Choice considerations 
The credibility of the exercise is undermined by the 
central bank’s own self-interest. If the central bank 
were to conclude that the banking system was unsound, 
then it couldn’t ever admit that in public: to do so 
would undermine public confidence and concede that 
its own policies towards the banks had been a failure. 
As a consequence, the stress tests can only be expected 
to come to one conclusion – that the banking system is 
sound – regardless of what the Bank of England might 
privately believe. 
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Put another way, the credibility of the stress tests is 
undermined by Public Choice considerations. Public 
choice theory tells us that regulatory agencies pursue 
their own self-interest, and in this context the regulatory 
agency’s self-interest is to reassure us that the banking 
system is sound. Therefore, we cannot expect the stress 
tests to give us an independent, unbiased assessment of 
the resilience of the banking system – and so the stress 
tests cannot be credible. 
Flaw #14: Stress tests are unaudited
Stress tests are not audited, and cannot be. This would 
be less of a problem, but for the fact that the central bank 
has an incentive – as we have just seen – to  produce 
results that make the banking system look good. The 
combination of these two factors further undermines 
any credibility that they might have had.
Flaw #15: Repeated stress testing becomes an 
increasingly irrelevant compliance exercise 
Evidence from the United States – the Federal Reserve 
has been conducting stress tests since 2009 – indicates 
that repeated stress testing is producing ever more 
predictable results. This finding suggests that the 
banks have learned how to play the stress testing game 
in order to pass the tests with the minimum cost and 
inconvenience. 
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There is now a flourishing cottage industry by which the 
banks hire experts to get them through the tests. The 
experts involved are former Federal Reserve officials 
who used to conduct the tests themselves, and who are 
much better remunerated as poachers than they used to 
be as gamekeepers. 
In the meantime, everyone involved is so focused on the 
regulatory risk metrics that they have lost sight of the 
risks the banks are actually taking.
Flaw #16: Stress testing creates new systemic risks 
that are invisible to everyone’s risk management 
systems
Stress testing creates new systemic risks because it 
exposes the entire banking system to the weaknesses in 
the models approved by the central bank and because 
it promotes standardisation across the industry when 
systemic stability requires diversity. In doing so, stress 
testing creates new systemic risks that are invisible to 
the risk management systems of both the banks and the 
central bank. 
Flaw #17: Regulatory stress testing has a disastrous 
track record elsewhere
The relentless message from stress tests overseas was 
that the system is sound and policymakers were often 
lulled into a false sense of security. Again and again, 
individual institutions (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
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in the United States, Dexia Bank in Europe, etc.) and 
even entire national banking systems (Iceland, Ireland, 
Cyprus, Greece) were signed off as safe by stress tests 
only to collapse unexpectedly afterwards. 
Even now, European regulators are still relying on their 
stress tests to provide false reassurance about the health 
of the European banking system, when it is obvious to 
everyone else that Eurozone banks are in an extremely 
precarious state.
Nor is there a single case where regulatory stress testing 
was ever proven to be of any use afterwards, i.e., by 
warning of an impending build-up so appropriate 
remedial action was then taken that allowed the banks 
concerned to weather the subsequent stress event. 
Instead, stress testing has repeatedly offered false 
comfort by blinding those involved to the real dangers 
they were facing. 
The conclusion from all of these is that the Bank 
of England’s stress tests are useless as indicators of 
the dangers facing the banking system, but that the 
practice of central bank stress testing is worse than 
useless because of the false risk comfort it provides. 
The banking system is then exposed to the danger that 
another major shock could bring it down again – and 
this danger could have been avoided. In the meantime, 
whatever opportunity still exists to remedy this problem 
is being squandered by the Bank of England’s refusal to 
acknowledge it. 
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8. What to do about 
the stress tests?
If stress tests are worse than useless because they 
provide false risk comfort, then the obvious solution is 
to scrap the programme. 
But if the stress test programme were scrapped, how 
would interested parties be able to assess the financial 
conditions of their banks? This is a good question, but 
a misplaced one. It is misplaced because central bank 
stress tests provide a misleading picture of banks’ 
financial health. However, it is also a good question 
because it points us in the right direction. 
The question of how to determine banks’ financial 
health is an age-old one and the stress tests do not 
solve it. There is and always has been only one solution 
to this problem: to get the underlying accounting 
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numbers right, and this is the purpose of the accounting 
standards. Our current IFRS accounting standards are 
manifestly unfit for the job, however. What is needed is 
a root and branch reform of accounting standards but 
failing that, a major step in the right direction would 
be to require banks to prepare parallel accounts under 
the old UK GAAP accounting standards regime that 
was superseded by IFRS in 2005. This reform could 
be implemented by enacting the Financial Services 
(Regulation of Derivatives) Bill that Steve Baker 
proposed as a Private Member’s Bill in 2011.86
As for the stress tests, if it is decided that they must 
continue then a very second best suggestion would be to 
patch up some of their more glaring weaknesses:
●	 The Bank should dispense with the CET1/
RWA stress test on the grounds that the RWA 
measure is discredited. 
●	 The numerator should be CET1 capital not Tier 
1 capital, on the grounds that the difference 
between the two, AT1 capital, does not meet 
the basic requirements to be considered as core 
capital: AT1 is fool’s gold, not the real thing. 
●	 The capital measure should be the minimum 
of market and book capital CET1 values, on 
Principle of Prudence grounds. This suggestion 
is essentially equivalent to Sir John Vickers’s 
suggestion that the BoE report parallel market- 
and book-based results for its stress tests. 
●	 The denominator should be the maximum of 
86  For more details see Kerr (2011), pp. 52-54. The text of the Bill itself – an 
elegant 3-pager drafted by Tim Bush – is explained on pp. 74-75. 
NO STRESS III 171
171
total assets and the leverage exposure, again on 
Principle of Prudence grounds. 
Anything that gets this particular genie even part way 
back into his bottle would be progress. Which point 
reminds us of the true nature of the stress tests: they 
are a form of magical thinking that purports to conjure 
up a strong banking system out of a weak one. To quote 
a famous practitioner:
Well Ali Baba had them forty thieves 
Scheherezad-ie had a thousand tales 
But master you in luck ‘cause up your sleeves 
You got a brand of magic never fails 
You got some power in your corner now 
Some heavy ammunition in your camp 
You got some punch, pizzazz, yahoo and how 
See all you gotta do is rub that lamp.
Can your friends do this? 
Do your friends do that? 
Do your friends pull this out their little hat? 
Can your friends go poof? 
Well, looky here 
Can your friends go, Abracadabra, let ‘er rip 
And then make the sucker disappear?
(With apologies to Robin Williams)
I prefer however to leave the last word to the most 
powerful magician of them all, Mephistopheles: Ich 
bin der Geist der stets verneint. Loosely translated: You 
can never rely on those darn stress tests when you need 
them.
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